

*With the compliments of  
the author.*

# THROUGH INDIA

Letters to the  
Westminster Gazette

By Sir Charles Eliot



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# THE WESTMINSTER GAZETTE.

## THE CONVICTION OF MR. TILAK.

To the EDITOR of THE WESTMINSTER GAZETTE.

SIR,—In the note on Mr. Tilak's career in your last Friday's issue there is a strange misapprehension, and as it has not been rectified perhaps you will allow me to state the facts. You say "His imprisonment for sedition in 1897 brought his name before the Western world, and the Government's subsequent failure, after a prolonged trial and appeal, to convict him on a criminal charge invested him with the prestige of a martyr." The truth, however, is that he was convicted and sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment; that the conviction was upheld by the Privy Council on appeal; that three months before the expiration of the term of imprisonment he was released on conditions the acceptance of which was a severe blow to his "prestige as a martyr"; that these conditions continued apparently until recently to be fulfilled; and that non-fulfilment rendered him liable to be arrested without warrant and to undergo the unexpired portion of his sentence.

Mr. Tilak is sometimes inaccurately spoken of as a Marátha, whereas he should be described as a Chitpáwan, or Kōkanasth *Dhobisity agbhebetor tóng power. tūdy, no scheme for en-*larging the area of employment of Indians would satisfy the popular demand unless it offered real authority and adequate emoluments, and unless all the principal sections of the community could alike benefit thereby. Lastly, the door to such high executive office as membership of Council should be a post of personal administrative responsibility, for which selection should be made, if necessary, outside the ranks of the permanent service. Indian gentlemen possess their full share of the gifts of eloquence and judicial aptitude, but on local boards their faculties are rather critical than administrative (saving a few distinguished exceptions), and there is a tendency, perhaps not unnatural, to avoid responsibility, especially in dealing with persons of another race or caste. Such dignified apprenticeship, therefore, in an administrative charge would be valuable alike as an instructive experience and as a probation.

Permit me, in conclusion, to protest against the uncharitable assumption of Bishop Gore (as reported in your issue of May 28), who, profoundly unconscious of his own limitations, attributed the present unrest in India to the petty tyrannies of Englishmen.—I am, Sir, yours faithfully,

July 27, 1908.

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P.S.—I see that in my desire to be brief I have omitted allusion, among conciliatory measures, to two matters of primary importance. One is that for the contentment of the great agricultural class, the chief factor in the security of our rule and the efficiency of our Indian Army, the land assessment system should be made more elastic, and that there should be real instead of nominal freedom of contract; the other is the urgency of providing liberal facilities for commercial education and training among the non-mercantile classes, so that the mental energies of the student class may be diverted from unprofitable subtleties, and that, instead of despair of finding employment in the Government service or in the legal profession, they may have a hopeful prospect of obtaining a fair share in the development of the natural resources and in the general prosperity of their country.

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Mr. Tilak is sometimes inaccurately spoken of as a Marátha, whereas he should be described as a Chitpáwan, or Kókanasth Brahmin, called Kókanasth because that section of the Brahmin community came from the Konkan, the race that supplanted the *Mardtha* house of Siváji's descendants, and established the dynasty of the Peshwas at Poona, which ended with Báji Rán, whose adopted son was the Nana Sahib of cruel memory. This race, possessing singular intellectual abilities, energetic, and ambitious, has never forgotten its lost ascendancy or abandoned the hope of regaining it; but it is divided in ideals or policy into two parties, the one which stimulates disaffection and unrest and expresses in the vernacular papers a barely veiled approval of violent methods, and proclaims orthodoxy as a rallying cry to influence other Hindu communities, especially the more ignorant or superstitious members of them; the other, of which the late Mr. Justice Banade, of the Bombay High Court, was a distinguished example, is imbued with the liberal ideas derived from Western education, recognises the need of social reform, and seeks its aims through some ill-defined process of constitutional development.

It is necessary for Englishmen who desire to have any grasp of the position in Western India to bear these facts in mind. The previous conviction of Mr. Tilak and his conditional release were regarded there with almost a feeling of relief, and the prestige of the moderate party increased; but it was felt that an isolated prosecution would be of no enduring value, and that what was wanted was a steadfast assertion of the law in reference to libellous and inflammatory publications, the better discipline of educational institutions, and of certain classes of Government employees, especially in reference to utterances at public meetings; an amendment of the Press Registration Act, to ensure greater weight and responsibility, and a more generous appreciation of the distinction between the moderates and the extremists. If this policy was not pursued, I can only surmise that its abandonment was due to misguided counsels in high quarters, or possibly to what a contemporary calls "a dread of the intervention of Parliament which would be amusing if it were not tragic." The result, at any rate, of suspended or suppressed vigilance has been tragic; it is difficult to put back the clock, and the first and imperative consideration is to reassure any wavering Oriental minds that we have the power and the will to preserve order. But it is unfortunate, if I may judge from the telegrams from Bombay, that the extremists should have regained even a temporary access of popularity, and also that British public opinion should only have learned from capital headlines during the last year, with a shock of surprise, that there is unrest in India. There always has been and always will be the spirit of unrest among certain sections of the community, ready to take advantage of any trouble or grievance, be it plague, famine, frontier disturbance, or partition of Bengal, and our business is by constant vigilance, by conciliatory measures, by the maintenance of order, and by an indisputable reserve of strength, to keep the flame from spreading.

Even if this letter be not already inadmissibly long, though the great importance of the subject may plead for its acceptance, I can only briefly indicate certain directions in which it would be profitable or unprofitable to go on the road to conciliation. First and foremost, there must be a well-considered and thorough scheme of decentralisation or devolution of authority. The most perfect secretarial mechanism is worthless for India in comparison with personal sympathy and influence, and commissioners of divisions, and collectors and magistrates of districts, must be in a large measure set free from the toil of correspondence and reports for the development of kindly personal relations. The tendency to centralisation has been growing for many years, and culminated, perhaps inevitably, in Lord Curzon's tenure of office as Viceroy. It must be ruthlessly curtailed. And another reform equally necessary is that no permanent employee should be promoted to high office, where his counsels are likely to carry weight, unless he is qualified by an intimate and recent experience of the people. The fact of the population not being homogeneous, of its consisting of a variety of theocracies with different languages and conflicting creeds, makes direct communal representation impossible or futile. It is of the greatest consequence, therefore, that those charged with the making and administration of the laws should have personal knowledge of the habits and feelings of the people. Secondly, power and responsibility must go hand in hand, and it is worse than useless to create bodies of advisers, the rejection of whose irresponsible advice would be sure to be the text for animosity against the ruling power. Thirdly, no scheme for enlarging the area of employment of Indians would satisfy the popular demand unless it offered real authority and adequate emoluments, and unless all the principal sections of the community could alike benefit thereby. Lastly, the door to such high executive office as membership of Council should be a post of personal administrative responsibility, for which selection should be made, if necessary, outside the ranks of the permanent service. Indian gentlemen possess their full share of the gifts of eloquence and judicial aptitude, but on local boards their faculties are rather critical than administrative (saving a few distinguished exceptions), and there is a tendency, perhaps not unnatural, to avoid responsibility, especially in dealing with persons of another race or caste. Such dignified apprenticeship, therefore, in an administrative charge would be valuable alike as an instructive experience and as a probation.

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## THROUGH INDIA.

BY SIR CHARLES ELIOT, K.C.M.G.

(*Late Commissioner for British East Africa*).

### I--A MELA AT GOBURDHAN.

A Mela means a religious fair, and Goburdhan is one of the many holy towns in the land of Braj, known to the British administration as the Muttra District in the United Provinces. It is a peaceful country, where nothing very particular seems to have happened since the time of Krishna, a time so distant that the learned have not quite decided whether its hero was altogether mythical. But the legend of Krishna is still a power. It attracts peasants who walk from the south of India and rich Bombay merchants who are made to part with their money on most unbusiness-like principles at shrines commemorative of romantic and improbable events. There is not much coherency about the legend, but, like everything Hindu, it lends itself to mysticism, speculation, and extravagant sentiment. Krishna, the predestined slayer of tyrants, spent his youth as a cowherd in this pastoral country, sporting with the milkmaids, like a faun with nymphs, and one of the commonest idols represents him in a dancing attitude playing on a pipe. One school of theology makes this village idyl a type of the soul's progress, and sees in the passionate milkmaids an image of human devotion to God. But the popular practice brings this mysticism back to very unedifying things of earth, and the erotic side of the Krishna legend is accentuated in its ceremonies and worship. Almost all varieties of religious sentiment are to be found in Hinduism. As a rule asceticism predominates as an ideal, but it is a peculiarity of the Vallabbacharyas, the principal sect of Muttra, to reject this doctrine and preach that salvation is to be found in enjoying the good things of this life provided by the gods. A comforting belief indeed, and no wonder if it is popular. But still the instinct of devotion and self-denial is so ingrained in the Hindu that it is the clergy rather than the people who profit by it. The priests are regarded as deities to be maintained in luxury, and the highest honour of the laity, especially of pious women, is to devote to their maintenance and pleasure body, soul, and purse.

The whole district is studded with sacred sites and pious memories. Here Krishna was born; here are his cradle and his mother's churn; here he stole the milkmaids' clothes; in this tank his own clothes used to be washed. But Goburdhan has greater marvels than these to show. In it is a hill, a long ridge of



limestone about a hundred feet high, which Krishna once held up over the heads of his followers to protect them against the anger of the god of the sky. You cannot doubt it, for he replaced the hill exactly as it was, in order to refute possible scepticism. Also there is a sacred tank called the Ganges of the Mind, or, in a more profane rendering, the imaginary Ganges, for Krishna, after slaying a demon in mortal conflict, felt the need of purifying himself in the sacred stream. In the vulgar geographical sense it was not there, so he caused it to rise for his ablutions—and again to confute scepticism—there it still is. Millions of people believe these stories, and hundreds of thousands yearly visit Muttra and are conducted by professional guides on a tour to the most remarkable sites. This extraordinary credulity is not merely a curious fact. It is of political and social importance, and enables one to see how it is, for instance, that the country people of India can seriously suppose that the Government is responsible for spreading the plague. We are apt to think too much of the few thousand educated Hindus who make themselves conspicuous, and forget this sediment—nay, rather, this foundation and body—of millions who, though far from barbarous, live in a world of magic where it seems easy to toss about mountains and turn rivers hither and thither as if they were water-pipes.

Goburdhan is distant from Muttra about thirteen miles along a level road bordered with trees. Pilgrims may be seen wending their way on foot, or in the placid bullock-cart, whose creaking wheels must disturb the meditative philosophy encouraged by its pace, or in various forms of rickety horse vehicles. But the most striking, and perhaps the most patronised, conveyance is a camel-cart. This is a small cage made of iron bars and poised on wheels. Within it are huddled an extraordinary number of human beings, and the roof is covered with a pile of leaves, to be ultimately eaten by the camel and meanwhile to protect the passengers against the sun. Now, a camel in the best of circumstances does not look an up-to-date and graceful animal; his bones seem to move on some archaic and imperfectly co-ordinated plan, and the model has wisely been discarded from the workshops of the creator in designing recent beasts. But when the camel appears drawing one of these tiny carts, whose shafts rise almost vertically on each side of his mighty hind-quarters, while his neck towers up in another world, his strange make and his want of keeping with the most moderate dose of civilisation are manifest, and he looks like some antediluvian saurian harnessed to the pigmy car of pre-historic man. But he goes his way, not with the uncomplaining meekness of the bullock or the superior intelligence of the elephant, but as one who does his duty but loves grumbling all the same.

Goburdhan, like most Hindu towns in Northern India, has few fine or ancient edifices to show. Most of the great temples of the Punjab and United Provinces were destroyed or defaced by Moslim fanaticism in the Middle Ages. What we see now are either modern restorations or ancient dismantled hulks, the solid structure which escaped after the pinnacles and towers had been destroyed. Goburdhan on an ordinary day probably consists of a few narrow, tortuous streets surrounding some half-ruined shrines.





of red sandstone and a few newer white buildings in better preservation and worse taste. But when one sees it on a festival one partly understands why the priests trouble themselves so little about repairs. Those who can command such a crowd need not care much about the beauty of its lodging. It is itself the best architectural ornament. This Mela is called the fair of a hundred thousand. That, no doubt, is an exaggeration; but many, many thousands are collected in the little town, largely women in their newest and brightest dresses—pink, blue, and bright saffron yellow. Every street is full, and the buildings above the street as well; the outline of the roofs and terraces is marked by rows of brilliantly dressed figures, perched wherever there is standing or sitting room. With such a crowd of worshippers, the eye does not notice that the shrine is shabby. Most picturesque of all, perhaps, are the ghats or stairs descending into the imaginary Ganges aforesaid. These great flights of steps, leading down the bank of a river or forming the four sides of a tank, are perhaps the most picturesque and original thing that Hindu architecture has to show; they are so calm, ample, and natural; they bid the sinner simply wash and be clean. At Goburdhan the great tank is peculiarly striking because it is not artificial and regular in shape, but the flights of steps are intersected by natural boundaries of rocks. On one side rises a white building containing the tombs of the Rajas of Bhurtpur, a neighbouring native State, and from its flat roof, crowded like every other part of the town with Hindu women, one can look down on the tank, which, as seen from above, appears an immense amphitheatre filled with a gaily dressed crowd extending to the water's edge, where it becomes amphibious. No nation has brought the art of discreet bathing to such perfection as the Hindus. In the middle classes, and, indeed, in all classes which are not Europeanised, the costume consists of nothing but simple lengths of cotton, longer or shorter, white or coloured, according to sex and caste, but for men and women alike devoid of sleeves, buttons, hooks, and other dodges of European clothes. How they stop on without falling off is a wonder, and it is still more wonderful to see the way that soaked garments are removed and dry ones substituted by movements which seem to be veritable sleight-of-hand and are never anything but decent and graceful. All women whom custom allows to wear colours appear at festivals in freshly dyed saris. Those dressed in white are widows, who are generally numerous at these gatherings, for they are almost the only distractions which the severe code of Hindu respectability allows to this unfortunate class. And it must be confessed that at a Mela piety earns its reward in diversions. The journey to Goburdhan has been long and difficult for most of the pilgrims, but once arrived there their religious duties do not seem onerous, or, as they would say themselves in a dangerously wide sense, religion sanctions all that they do. There are certainly shrines and deities innumerable to be saluted, priests to be fed, and holy beggars awaiting alms; but there are also jugglers, singers, dancers, and vendors of every kind of food, some of which has had the advantage of being consecrated and can be eaten by anybody without sin. The most definite religious



observance is the singing of Kirtans, or hymns, a special feature of the sect founded by the reformer Chaitanya in the sixteenth century. They consist chiefly in the repetition of the names of the Deity, accompanied by dancing and playing on drums and stringed instruments. Anybody who has compared this ceremony with the worship of the Howling Dervishes as seen at Constantinople and elsewhere cannot doubt that, whatever the differences of doctrine may be, the form of nervous excitement produced is the same. The singers start in the surrounding villages and arrive at Goburdhan in the evening, capering and singing, and gradually infect the crowd with their excitement. Many of those whom I saw were quite elderly men, and I was told that they were mostly people of substance, and some of them bankers before they gave up the things of the world.

It is interesting to see how these fairs attract all classes of Hindus. They have played and still play an important part in keeping up the idea of India and the unity of Hindus in spite of differences. It is true that if one used such language to most of the pilgrims they would not understand it, and would give no account of themselves, except that they are of such-and-such a caste and from such-and-such a town or village. But they stream to this spot, and to a hundred others like it, from all parts of India, whereas if it lay outside the limits of India, in Burma or Baluchistan, it would not attract them. For Hindus, though they are not unwilling to worship new and strange gods, do not like new and strange places. The crowd is not of the same language, for one may hear Hindi, Bengali, and Telugu all spoken; it is hardly of the same race, and, strictly speaking, not of the same religion; for though they are all worshippers of Krishna, they belong to different sects, and their doctrines and to some extent their practices are as different as those of Romanists and Baptists, yet here they have a common centre where they meet amicably. It is true that the interference of Mohammedans, or even of a hostile sect of Hindus, might provoke a passionate and sanguinary riot, but as long as such incidents are avoided the crowd is orderly, in spite of its hysterical excitement, and hardly any exercise of authority seems necessary. I was the only European present, and absolutely the only official was a Hindu Tahsildar, or head of the sub-district, with a fair number of Hindu police under his orders. These latter certainly did assert themselves. They cut a path through the crowd and hustled people out of the way with a roughness which would have provoked murmuring, if not resistance, in Europe. But here they only met with obedience, or at most a reproachful, inquiring stare. One sees that the Hindus are an easy people to govern.

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


## II.—RAJPUTANA.

Probably even well-informed people do not give sufficient prominence to Rajputana in their thoughts about India. One is apt to imagine that Mohammedans are martial, but in thinking of a Hindu to make a hasty mental compound of a Babu and Coolie—something mild, laborious, intelligent, talkative, astute rather than bold, and so on. But Rajputana, the home of the Rajput clans, lying north of the Vindhya and in the Aravalli mountains, has little kinship or sympathy with the lawyers and merchants of Bengal; and though it is a country of Indian kings, they have not much more in common with ordinary oriental despots than with the constitutional monarchs of Europe. It is a land of tribal aristocracies, intensely proud of their birth, and penetrated by a spirit of adventure, heroism, romance, loyalty, and tragedy, singularly unlike that which inspires most Indian annals.

One of its most ancient and interesting cities is Udaipur, the capital of Mewar, the country of the Sisodhia branch of the Solar house, who claim to be descended from the sun, and to be the first and oldest of the thirty-six royal houses of Rajputana. Not only the Royal Family but the nobility are of this clan, and at court ceremonies the great nobles take precedence of the Heir-Apparent. For more than eleven hundred years this family has reigned in Mewar, and, after defying the Mohammedan Emperors of Delhi on countless occasions, at last made an honourable peace, and were treated with the utmost distinction. Their pride of race knows no bounds: they refused to give their daughters in marriage to the Emperors of Delhi, or to other Rajputs who might contract such alliances, and when at last intermarriage with these latter was resumed it was stipulated that the sons of a Mewar princess should have a right to the succession before the sons of other queens, whatever their seniority. Hence many quarrels and poisonings ensued. Even in recent years the Rani of Udaipur has found herself unable to see any of the English princesses who have visited India, and these pretensions are not thought excessive by Hindu opinion, for the family is recognised as the purest and most aristocratic blood in all India.

The fortunes of Mewar began to decline in the eighteenth cen-



ture, with those of its old enemy the Empire of Delhi. As the central power decayed, disintegration and disorder became general throughout India, and what new vigour was forthcoming arose not in Rajputana but among the Mahrattas. Invited first of all to arbitrate in the quarrels of the princely families, they repeatedly invaded and desolated the country, which was also harassed by the feuds of its own nobles and the depredations of the Pindaris. It was only an alliance with the British, contracted in 1818, that saved Mewar from total decadence, and the reconstruction of the state was materially assisted by the devoted labours of Colonel Tod, the first British Resident, who is perhaps best known by his monumental work "The Annals of Rajasthan," but who also rendered no small service by his influence and advice. Rajputana, and specially Mewar, has always felt grateful for the assistance rendered by Great Britain at this critical period, and we have probably no more loyal friends in India than her princes. To doubt their professions and think that in time of stress they would turn against us is not only a poor compliment, but shows no discrimination in judgment of character, for the Rajputs are not calculators or sycophants, and their whole history is full of deeds of quixotic valour, of devotion to ideals, of unforgetting loves and hatreds. I ought perhaps to remind the reader that by no means all native princes are Rajputs: also that Rajputs are touchy.

The railway which now leads to Udaipur branches off from the main line at Chitor. Here an ancient fort on a high hill dominates the plain, which, but for this eminence, stretches uninterruptedly to the mountains behind Mewar. It is a place of stirring and martial memories, instinct with that profound spirit of tragedy and self-sacrifice which marks the Hindu's deeper feelings. Krishna, the national deity and hero, is typical of the race; in his best-known aspect he is a joyous sensualist; in another a metaphysician and poet; but withal he was born to bring about the destruction of his kinsmen by internecine war, and when that was accomplished he was slain himself. The Hindu shows the same mixture of sensuality and tragedy. Three times has the steep and zigzag road which, under many gateways, leads up to the fortress of Chitor witnessed the rite known as Johar. When at the end of a siege further resistance was impossible, the women were placed in a subterranean chamber filled with combustibles, and there burnt, while the men, dressed in robes of saffron yellow and intoxicated with drugs, made a sudden sally down the hill and fought till the last was killed. At least two of these desperate struggles were about women. There have been many Helens in India, but among the Rajputs their beauty, if it caused wars, did not secure them gentle treatment. The last siege of Chitor, terminated by the greatest of the Johars, was brought about by the refusal of the Ranas of Mewar to give one of their daughters in marriage to the Emperor Akbar; and even in the eighteenth century a princess who inspired such violent passions that her suitors seemed about to plunge Rajputana into war for her hand was, with her own consent, killed by her father as the simplest way of settling the dispute.





Women have played no small part in the history of the Rajputs and Mahrattas, in spite of the seclusion which their rank obliges them to keep in modern times. We hear of one who headed a sally from Chitor in person; the Rani of Jhansi fought in the Indian Mutiny and fell in battle; and Ahalya Bai, of Indore, was one of the most capable sovereigns that India has produced. But the flames of Suttee shed a lurid light over their annals. It may have been encouraged by the meanest motives, but it was also rooted in heroism, and was for a woman what death in battle was for a man.

After its sack by Akbar, Chitor was recovered for the Rajputs, but the capital was removed to Udaipur, and the old fort remains a mass of ruins, with a bazaar below. But the beauty and delicacy of the carving attests the skill and artistic feeling of these fanatical aristocrats, who perished with almost all their race rather than give a daughter to the greatest of Mohammedan emperors. There is the Tower of Victory and the Tower of Fame, strong but elegant structures, covered by patient labour with images and tracery suggestive of the modern Rajputs as one sees them now, slightly built men of delicate but martial make, with taper fingers and beards parted in the middle. There, too, are the tragic memorials: the slope down which the last rush took place, the place of funeral pyres, and the entrance to the subterranean chamber where the women were burned.

Udaipur, the present capital of Mewar, is one of the most picturesque spots in all India. It has the double interest of almost complete isolation and a singularly beautiful situation. The administration and government are just as they were a thousand years ago and no reforms have dared to impair the Rana's prerogative, but he rules not as a despot but as the head of an ancient aristocratic clan whose kinsmen have rights and swords to defend them. He is an austere sovereign, and devotes his time to the personal administration of his country, which is practically his private estate. His only pastime is tiger-shooting, not a very commendable pursuit according to Hindu ideas; but this ancient military aristocracy, though scrupulously religious, have never been slavishly obedient to the Brahmans and have their own ideas of what a gentleman may do. He was absent on one of these expeditions when I visited Udaipur. On his return the women of the town go out to meet him and line the road, and ancient custom decrees that a largess of silver coin should be thrown to them by the guards who ride behind the Rana's carriage.

Udaipur is a walled city partly surrounding a beautiful lake. Islands with pavilions and pleasure-gardens diversify its waters, and along one side rises a ridge on which is built the palace, or rather it grows out of the rock and acquires thereby an imposing natural solidity, for it seems to be hill, palace, and fortress in one. Inside, one is perhaps struck most with the great superiority of old taste over new. The generation of to-day loves terrible painted glass and discordant colours, but their ancestors built marble loggias, with gardens and fountains in the midst and carved balconies hanging over the lake. In these cool courts the Rana spends his time in patriarchal bureaucracy. He has not been



able to escape the plague of papers, but he has everything read to him and forms a personal opinion on each case.

The streets of Udaipur are narrow and often steep lanes, flanked by painted walls bearing pictures of elephants and horse-men, and by staircases leading up to temples or the unseen houses of the well-to-do. In strange contrast to them are the public gardens, which formerly were part of the palace grounds, but have been thrown open to the town by the present Rana, who, if little disposed to adopt the ways of European monarchs, at least shows discrimination in what he does imitate. In these gardens the youth of Udaipur may be seen playing at tennis and cricket, and from a distance one might suppose they were Europeans. It is only recently that Indians have taken to athletic sports, but their genuine interest and skill are both evident. The change is remarkable, and shows what unexpected points of contact there may be between Asiatics and Europeans, for on a priori grounds one would have been inclined to argue that Hindus have neither a taste for such exercises nor the necessary physique. Even more remarkable is the scene on the playing-fields of Mayo College at Ajmere, one of the Chiefs' Colleges, where the sons of Rajputs, including heirs-apparent and even sovereigns who are minors, are educated in a way suitable to their future position, and learn English and such things as a prince ought to know. It is a most aristocratic Indian Eton, where the various States of Rajputana keep up boarding-houses in which their youth can be lodged with their own retainers and receive from them food warranted not to pollute their caste or to contain poison—a danger which is ever before the eyes of the Rajput noble. It is difficult to imagine anything more picturesque than these youths when dressed in white robes and blue turbans, for their physique and features are all that besem their reputed lineage from gods and heroes. It is less poetic, but highly interesting, to see them playing lawn-tennis in flannel trousers and taking instruction in cricket from a Parsee professional. They are good horsemen too, and like playing polo, but are not encouraged to do so as long as the college is responsible for them. Accidents will occur at this game, it seems, and it is hard to persuade Rajputs that accidents to heirs-apparent are unconnected with the designs of rivals.

But if one feels that cricket and a Parsee professional, though gratifying phenomena, are discordantly modern, it is always easy in India to go back a hundred or a thousand years. Near Udaipur is the Mahasati, the burying-place of the kings, a beautiful grove rising round chapels and marble canopies, under which lie the ashes of departed Ranas. Those of their wives who accompanied them to the flames are represented in effigy. Here, as elsewhere, the temples and cemeteries are full of animals. Parrots and peacocks perch on the pinnacles or roost in the sacred trees, where no one but the monkeys dare disturb them. Fishes, turtles, and even crocodiles bask lazily in the tanks and sacred rivers, their natural snappishness perhaps somewhat tempered by the long habit of feeding on the offerings brought by the devout. All cattle enjoy a certain respect and sanctity. Those which have



been definitely devoted to a life of religious ease wander about in the temples or streets, and are sometimes dyed yellow with saffron. They eat whatever takes their fancy, regardless of who the proprietor may be, and seem to take a peculiar pleasure in lying down in the middle of a crowded passage. The crowd divide respectfully to the right and left, and do not venture to disturb their repose. The camels shoot out their lips at them with envious contempt, the envy of people who are obliged to work much against their will and find their consolation in despising the indolent lives of the moneyed classes.

Familiarity with men and gods has not taught the sacred beasts to perform tricks or do anything which men call intelligent. No doubt they scorn to imitate the ways of the human race, but they look after their own comfort with placid calm and seem to understand what is going on without thinking it of much importance. They or their likes have been looking at much the same scene for thousands of years, for this animal world is the real Unchanging East. As one sits by the side of the sacred tank under the pipul tree, when men have gone to their afternoon sleep, the centuries slip backwards, the hordes of British and Moguls fade away like ghosts, and we seem to be living in a beast-fable, the Indian Jataka. The oxen yoked to the pilgrims' cart in the shade discuss the character of their owner; the parrot explains to his companions that he has given up talking since he got into such sad trouble for telling his master of his mistress's doings; the peacock posing on the temple wall still displays his plumage as he did when he danced at his own wedding till the King of the birds, his future father-in-law, swore that he would not give his daughter to such a vulgar, ostentatious fellow; and on the lowest step the monkey talks with mingled curiosity and caution to the crocodile in the water, as he did in the days when Brahmadatta was King in Benares and the blessed Buddha himself a monkey King.



### III.—THE UNREST.

It is not easy to estimate the real extent and importance of the unrest prevailing in India. It has been greatly exaggerated. Telegrams, for instance, have appeared stating that on certain railway lines Europeans dared not travel without carrying loaded rifles as a protection; and, again, quite recently we have read in the telegrams reports of loyal demonstrations and been told that the political extremists have collapsed. Perhaps before this letter is printed we shall hear that they are dangerously active again. Clearly there is a good deal of hysterical sentiment in India, particularly in the newspapers. The rise and fall of the emotional waves must be distinguished from the main current underneath; but my impression is that the general situation is not alarming but serious. We have not been on the brink of another Mutiny. Whatever disasters may be in store for India, it is not likely that the troubles of 1857 will be repeated in the same form. The conditions of the country, both military and general, have altered; the system of recruiting the Army has been changed, and the control of the artillery is exclusively in the hands of European troops; so that, even if the temper of the native soldiery were the same as in 1857, the risk of defeat and massacre is sensibly diminished. But, on the other hand, the organisation of government is far more complicated and delicate than it was fifty years ago, and a disturbance much less than a mutiny would suffice, if not to upset, at least to embarrass it. It is often said that we govern India only by the consent of the population. To such an extent is this true that no revolt or mutiny is necessary to throw the machine out of gear. Mere abstention from enlistment would suffice. There are about 158,000 native troops in India, and only about 74,000 European troops. All the lower branches of the Civil Service are filled by Indians; the working of the railways, posts, and telegraph depends on a constant supply of Indian clerks and officials. If an unwillingness to enlist were to prevail; if the civil functionaries were to strike, or the supply of efficient and willing public servants were to cease; and if the work of defending, administering, and policing India had really to be performed by Europeans, it is difficult to imagine what would happen. If we could





continue to govern India on such conditions, it could only be at the cost of enormous constitutional and social changes in the British Empire itself.

From this point of view the existence of even slight unrest and dissatisfaction in India assumes a new importance. It is not a question of the possibility of tragic disasters, of revolts and massacres, of invasions by Russia with the assistance of a native rising. We hope that all that is improbable, but we should like to be sure that there is nothing in the present temper which will impede the easy working of our system, which is simply the government of India by Indians under British direction. That, I think, is a fair description of the existing method of administration, but the word "direction" must be understood in its full force, for the Indian element in the government of the country, though enormous, acts almost entirely as an instrument. It is only to a very limited extent that it co-operates in the work of supervision and guidance.

The unrest has been described as a skin disease, and it may be hoped that this is true, if it means that there is no reason to apprehend the existence of any deep-seated organic malady. But, as many critics have already pointed out, skin diseases are most disagreeable and, above all, irritating things. Even prickly heat is an intolerable nuisance, and if a human body shows skin disease in most of its limbs the general constitution is likely to suffer unless a cure can be found. The gravest symptom about the Indian unrest is that the external manifestations—the eruption, so to speak—appear in so many and such distant places. The causes seem to be radically different in each locality, unless we reckon the presence of deliberate agitators as a common cause; but what the facts amount to is this: in the most different parts of India, from Rawal Pindi in the extreme North-West to Eastern Bengal and to Cocanada in the territory of Madras, the temper of the people is such that they respond to the irritants applied by the agitator. There are large sections of the population with real or imaginary grievances (and an imaginary grievance may be quite as dangerous as a real one) and unsatisfied aspirations. The seditious statements of the agitator are not treated as ridiculous libels on the Government—which they demonstrably are—but obtain an attentive hearing.

Nor is it a matter of small importance if the majority of educated Indians, at least of those who have received some European education, are discontented; and I fear that we must admit that this is the fact. People often say that the Babus and educated classes are not representative, and that as long as the fighting-races remain loyal to us we can hold India. Both of these statements are true, but the mistake is to regard them as relevant to the present situation. The educated classes in India do not represent the peasantry to the same extent that the educated classes in Europe represent the ideas and aspirations of the bulk of their several nations, but, for all that, being Indians, they can, when they try, influence the uneducated classes at least as much as British officials, and also their influence and their numbers are both growing; for while we grumble at the results of education we continue to impart it, not very efficiently perhaps, but



still persistently. Nor can it be said that the discontent is merely transitory. It seemed to be dying out in the summer, but in the late autumn many fresh manifestations were reported. The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal has drawn the Supreme Government's serious attention to the fact that classes which have hitherto been loyal are becoming disaffected, and no one appears to know how to stop that disaffection. The Government of India can prohibit meetings, suppress newspapers, and even close colleges. But such methods are not really satisfactory. We need harmony and consent. If the European members of the Viceroy's Legislative Council vote one way and the Indian members another, the victory rests with the Europeans, but such a victory is not a matter for congratulation. In fact it is very disquieting.

Neither is it to the point to say that we can hold India with the assistance of the fighting-races. To hold India as an oriental ruler holds his conquests, and administer it for the advantage of Britons and their supporters, would be a much simpler and in some ways more logical form of government than our present complicated and often inconsistent system. But it is not the policy to which all our past work leads up, and it is not a policy of which Parliament is likely to approve, for it would be contrary to the ideals to which from time to time we do homage.

Though the disturbances which have occurred are disagreeably persistent, yet none of them if described and considered calmly are very alarming. Those in the Punjab perhaps attracted the most attention, partly because they resulted in the deportation of Lala Lajpat Rai, and partly because the Sikhs, whom we have always regarded as one of the most trustworthy and loyal sections of Indian society, seemed concerned in them. Setting aside newspaper articles, the outward signs of trouble were riots at Lahore and Rawal Pindi. Europeans were hustled, and the military were called in to suppress the disorder. Then everything quieted down, and the classes who had been most uproarious vied with one another in protestations of loyalty. The nature of the trouble appears to have been twofold. First, the colonists on the Chenab Canal had certain agrarian grievances—minute, perhaps, in the eyes of outside observers, but still real—and, secondly, agitators worked upon these grievances for their own purposes, and created a temper hostile to the Government.

The reader is probably aware that the Government of the Punjab has for some time past been occupied with vast enterprises of irrigation and colonisation. Formerly the province consisted largely of desert tracts intersected by great rivers, whose fertilising power did not extend far beyond their banks. By a wonderful system of canal works the volume of water which before was wasted has been spread over a large area, and the desert has been turned into fruitful fields. The Chenab Canal is said to irrigate about two million acres. The new country has been peopled by peasants drawn from various districts of the Punjab, and holding land under agreements with the Government. It would appear that applicants were plentiful; the land and the crops proved excellent, and the colony was in most



ways a signal success. But it is said that it was over-administered: that there were too many functionaries, and too much red-tape. In particular, the Government are criticised for having given the Irrigation Department too great powers of interference, with the result that engineers who had little practical experience of native manners and customs made regulations affecting the daily life of the colonists, and this, in its turn, resulted not only in the issue of unwittingly vexatious regulations, but in the delegation of far too much power to native subordinates, who were not slow to exact blackmail. I do not know whether this statement is true, but I can believe it, for, in spite of the best intentions, something very similar happened when the Uganda Railway was in process of construction, and the engineering staff were charged with the supervision and administration of the country through which it passed. Recognising that the condition of the Chenab Colony was not wholly satisfactory, the Punjab Legislative Council drew up a new Colony Law, which had for its main object to condone certain irregularities on the part of the colonists, and in many particulars to render the regulations less irksome and more liberal. It was a complicated and technical measure, not easy for the layman to understand, and in many points wilfully misrepresented by agitators to the ignorant agriculturists, who were chiefly affected by it. But it seems to be admitted that in some details of little importance it did modify retrospectively agreements which had already been made. It deprived tenants, for instance, of the right to dispose of their property by will, and it required them to plant a certain number of trees which had not been previously stipulated. In such provisions the agitators found the handle which they required, and this brings us to the second feature of the situation—namely, the presence of disloyal politicians from quite a different part of India, who had no special interest in the Punjab colonies, but who endeavoured to make capital incidentally out of agrarian grievances which were really very insignificant. They held meetings and addressed considerable audiences. It is said that in all twenty-eight were held, of which only five related to the grievances of the colonists, the others dealing with general political questions; so that it cannot be held that the new law and the condition of the colonies were the real cause of the disturbance. They were merely subsidiary causes utilised by the agitators, but unfortunately they were well adapted to foment discontent, for the colonists were drawn from various parts, and the recital of their wrongs lost nothing when it was repeated to their relatives, who could not check the agitators' statements by their own experience. Special efforts were made to secure the presence of Sikhs at these meetings: they were told that as the chief military class they would be called upon to shoot down their own countrymen, and disaffection and rebellion were openly preached to them. The lower and more superstitious strata of the population were inflamed and terrified by stories to the effect that the Government were deliberately propagating the plague—a strange accusation, to which I shall have to recur, for, unfortunately, the Indian peasant does not dismiss it as an absurdity. Nor were literary methods



neglected. Leaflets, such as that entitled "Golden Bengal" and others, were circulated in the Punjab and other parts of India, inciting not only to sedition but to massacre of Europeans; and every attempt was made to bring this abominable literature, which was mostly printed in America and sent to India in closed envelopes, into the hands of native troops and students in the various educational establishments. About the same time articles appeared at Lahore in a native newspaper containing an account of how an English officer had killed his servant on a shooting expedition because the man had refused to carry home the carcass of a wild pig. This story was a wilfully distorted version of an accident which occurred no less than seven years ago. But it was served up as a modern event, and in a form carefully calculated to appeal to the religious prejudices of all classes, for the Hindu dislikes any form of sport which involves taking life; and the Mohammedan, though he has no objection to killing animals, regards touching a pig as defilement.

It is, on the whole, gratifying that this determined attempt to create disaffection produced no greater outburst. Its result was limited to riots which occasioned no loss of life and were easily suppressed. I do not see that any serious objection can be raised to the restrictive measures taken or to the punishment of the agitators Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh. Even those Bengalis to whom I have talked have little to say except that Lajpat Rai was a man of good character and would be able to explain away the charges for which he was deported if given a public trial. Now I have had to deal myself with cases of deportation in which no reason was assigned. It is an unsatisfactory procedure, and liable to abuse. But in the present case, seeing what undoubtedly did occur, particularly the attempts to render the Sikhs disloyal and the insinuations that the Government were intentionally spreading the plague, I can imagine half a dozen things justifying deportation which Lajpat Rai may have done and half a dozen reasons for not making them public. He has just been set at liberty. It is a fine and, I hope, a judicious act of clemency.





#### IV.—THE UNREST (continued).

I have touched on what happened in the extreme North-West of India. The events which occurred at Coconada, on the east coast of Madras, were of an entirely different character. A European chastised a native youth who annoyed him by singing *Bande Mataram*, hooting, jeering, and obstructing the thoroughfare. The sequel was a riot, which took the form of an attack on the European Club. The matter was dealt with by ordinary legal methods. Thirteen rioters, including the head of the *Swadeshi* company, were sentenced to fines and terms of rigorous imprisonment varying from eighteen months to two years, but the above-mentioned youth, in another suit brought against his European assailant, obtained a hundred rupees damages. The Court held that the provocation did not justify the defendant in taking the law into his own hands, and expressed regret that he did not act with patience, discretion, and forbearance. Here we have in a nutshell two of the causes which produce trouble and friction in India. A section of natives—I believe myself a small section—enjoy any opportunity of treating Europeans disrespectfully, and most Europeans are roused to excessive fury by the smallest want of respect.

If the troubles of Coconada had been an isolated event they would have little importance, but, taken in conjunction with other incidents elsewhere, they have this disagreeable feature, that they seem to be due to racial antipathy. I have no knowledge of what occurred except that derived from the accounts published in Indian newspapers, but I do not see how one can avoid this distressing conclusion. Acute racial antipathy is present in India, only, I hope, in minute quantities; but it does exist, and it is the most dangerous symptom which our Indian Empire presents. It can never be anything but a disruptive force and a danger to government, even if government takes the form of a military despotism; but when government exists only in virtue of co-operation between two races, it is clear that mutual respect and tolerance is the primary and essential condition for its continuance. Yet one hears that when European troops are called out to restore order in times of disturbance it is necessary to keep a firm hand on them to prevent them from dealing too



severely with the native crowd; and in travelling through India I have seen more than one case where Europeans of the lower classes have insisted on Indians being turned out of railway carriages, on the ground that they were white men and would not travel with natives, whom they described in very coarse language. On the other hand, one has only to read some of the leaflets recently circulated to feel that there are Indians among whom the lives of Europeans would not be safe, although it is with some pleasure that one reflects that these miscreants appear to belong to the least warlike races.

But such feelings are, I think, comparatively rare among both natives and Europeans of the better class. It is, no doubt, best to give them as little publicity as possible; it is even, I venture to think, a mistake to select the present time for publishing accounts of the mutiny. Of much larger proportions is the vague discontent and dissatisfaction prevalent among the educated classes, particularly students, which has shown itself in the United Provinces as well as in Bengal. It finds expression in disorderly meetings and offences against college discipline, trivial in themselves, but still significant if one considers that they are widespread, and coincide in time with other disturbances. The chief social grievance at the bottom of these troubles is probably that the number of men who receive a high education is much greater than the number of posts available for highly educated men. Consequently there is bound to be a class of educated malcontents without employment or with employment which they rightly or wrongly think beneath their merits. A precisely similar excess of applicants over posts was one of the main causes of Russian Nihilism fifteen or twenty years ago. In India it is regrettable to observe that there is a certain connexion between education and disaffection. The most distinctly disloyal movement seems to have started at Poona University, under the guidance of Brahmans, and to have spread across Central India to the United Provinces and Bengal. I do not at all draw the conclusion that education is a bad thing for Indians, but rather that they want more of it, and in a more general form—an education which should make some attempt to influence equally the various aspects of the student's life as a whole, and base itself on the foundations which it finds ready established. But at present the studies and life-experience of many Indian students present the strangest jumble of contrasts. Many of them come from homes where all the fundamental social usages, the relations between the sexes, between masters and servants, between the older and younger generations, are regulated by principles totally strange and antipathetic to European ideas. They may be observers of caste, and very probably worshippers of Kāli, a goddess whose priests abstain from human sacrifice out of respect for the Penal Code, but can hardly be said to condemn it. With government and authority a student's practical acquaintance is likely to be derived partly from respectful observation of the splendour of Hindu Rajas and partly from contact with Anglo-Indian bureaucracy, a most just and efficient form of government, but still not precisely that contemplated by philosophic Liberalism. Then, on the top of this experience, comes



suddenly the reading of the social and political philosophy of the nineteenth century, of authors like Mill and Bentham, who wrote for Europeans with the long evolution of the European state and society behind them, without which modern political and sociological theories are hardly intelligible. Besides, as Lord Curzon has pointed out, the three most brilliant writers or speakers whose works form the classical literature in English about India—Burke, Macaulay, and Bright—are all conspicuously wrong in their verdicts, and all contain much invective against the Government of India—admirable as rhetoric, but unfair as criticism, and dangerous if accepted (as it is by natives at the present day) as applicable to contemporary administration. Is it any wonder that the Hindu mind—of all varieties of human intelligence the most receptive and retentive—in passing from such a grounding to such a superstructure of education, rushes to the conclusion that India is down-trodden and kept in subjection, defrauded of the institutions which ensure the progress and prosperity of nations? The proclivity to theoretical and unpractical conclusions is increased by the circumstance that the type of education for which the Indian has the greatest aptitude, and which, as a matter of fact, he receives, is almost entirely literary. Instruction in science is only just being introduced and the only branch of education much cultivated which does not deal mainly with words is mathematics. For that, indeed, the Indian has a surprising talent; but still his power of calculation does not imply any sound knowledge of political and social problems. He is too prone to ingenious theorising divorced from the facts, which obviously ought to be taken into account. For instance, Mr. Tilak, one of the leaders of the Poona movement, has published a volume entitled "The Arctic Origin of the Vedas," in which he seeks to demonstrate that the Vedas contain traces of a period when the Aryan race lived within the arctic circle, whence they subsequently descended to Central Asia and India. The work was composed, as the preface states, when the talented author was undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for a political offence, and one is tempted to see an analogy between his political and scientific views. For though his thesis is supported by an array of arguments which give proof of much learning and ingenuity, it has not secured the acceptance of scholars because a great many simple and commonplace considerations on which Mr. Tilak does not dwell render it very improbable. And this is typical of much of the rhetoric and argument of Hindu politicians. It is difficult to object to their contentions in the abstract—and a contention which is objectionable in the abstract must indeed be bad—but one has no difficulty in seeing that they leave out of account the circumstances of their country which render what is applicable to Europe totally inapplicable to India.

But it would be a mistake to regard the educated natives of India as wholly unpractical people—mere rhetoricians and journalists. As administrators and soldiers they do not rival Europeans, but in all branches of the law they show no inferiority; and, though in trade the scale and style of their enterprises have



hitherto been somewhat different from ours, they are keen men of business, and it is said that both as bankers and as merchants they are adopting European commercial methods and competing more and more with Anglo-Indian houses.

But I am forgetting the recent symptoms of unrest which it was my intention to review. In the United Provinces, the district between the Punjab and Bengal, they were not serious or connected, and consisted chiefly of isolated disturbances in educational establishments. The religious body known as the Arya Samaj has also incurred the suspicion of disloyalty. It is a theistic community, analogous to the better-known but less influential Brahmo Samaj of Bengal, to which, however, it is not affiliated, having been founded separately about fifty years ago by Pandit Dayananda Sarasvati in Northern India, where it has branches in the principal towns, each numbering several thousand members. Of all modern Hindu sets, it is said to be the one which increases most rapidly. Its views are liberal in social questions such as caste and the remarriage of widows, but in theology it takes the Vedas as its basis and maintains a more strictly Indian attitude than the Brahmo Samaj. This latter is an unqualified supporter of the British Government, and it is perhaps not unnatural that the Arya Samaj, striving to be less unorthodox, while introducing reforms distasteful to old-fashioned Indian ideas, should adopt an anti-European view in political questions in order to show that it is national in spirit. However, though it is believed to be in sympathy with agitators, I have not heard of any disturbances definitely connected with it; but here, again, one cannot but regret that a movement which, like education, ought to be an unmixed good to the country should become hostile to the Government.

Far more prolonged and obstreperous are the signs of unrest which have occurred in Bengal. I propose to deal with this district subsequently in greater detail, and will therefore here only sketch in a few words what has occurred. The provocation for the recent trouble came from the partition of Bengal—that is, the creation of a new province consisting of the north-eastern portions of the old province of Bengal with Assam. This evoked an explosion of indignation for several reasons. The partition seemed derogatory to the metropolitan position of Calcutta and its importance as a centre; it constituted a province in which the Mohammedans were in the majority, whereas in United Bengal the majority belonged to the Hindus; and, perhaps more than all, it gave politicians and journalists a definite grievance well adapted to oratorical and literary treatment. It resulted in a prolific crop of seditious speeches, pamphlets, and articles; in the Swadeshi movement or boycott of European goods; in a good deal of trouble between the Hindu and Mohammedan inhabitants of Eastern Bengal; in assaults on the police, and perhaps in some on Europeans, though these were greatly exaggerated by report.

Reviewing the disturbances in all parts of India as a whole, one cannot but feel that they were very ineffectual, and, except in Bengal, were not long in subsiding. The mass of the people was rarely involved. The Colonists of the Punjab Canals became tran-





quil as soon as their small grievances were redressed; the quarrels between Mohammedans and Hindus in Eastern Bengal, though troublesome to the Administration, were not an anti-European manifestation on the part of the bulk of the population. Except for the riot at Rawal Pindi, the districts near the frontier remained quiet. What is regrettable, however, is to find a widespread feeling of disaffection among the educated classes, and in such progressive institutions as the Arya Samaj. It does not extend to all educated Indians; not, for instance, to the Parsees or to the Rajas and aristocracy as a class, and less to Mohammedans than Hindus, but among the educated Hindu middle-class, particularly in Bengal and the district of Poona, it is clearly prevalent. This class is mostly unwarlike, and its discontent is not likely to take the form of rebellion (especially as natives of India are in ordinary circumstances forbidden to carry arms), but it finds expression in seditious speeches and literature. What is the real importance of such utterances, particularly of newspaper articles, it is difficult to judge. The view of the Indian authorities (which is perhaps changing) seems to have been that prosecution or suppression only confers notoriety, and that it is best to take as little notice as possible. That may be so, but no one will dispute that the Indian Government have been exceptionally lenient, and that in such matters it is their tolerance rather than their supposed tyranny that demands explanation. As long as the articles in the Calcutta papers only reach their urban readers it perhaps does not matter much what they say, but things would be very different if their language produced an effect on the great masses of rural population or on the troops, and the most serious feature of the Punjab troubles is that the agitators did deliberately attempt to poison the minds of these classes. It is most unsatisfactory if our civilising influence in India results in the Government having to muzzle the educated classes, but it is even worse if the publications of the educated classes advocate sedition and hint at rebellion and massacre.



### V.—BENGAL AND THE BENGALI.

Though unrest has been prevalent in most parts of Northern India and the symptoms in the Punjab have presented some features of peculiar gravity, yet it is in Bengal that the uneasiness is most conspicuous and most persistent, and the ordinary Englishman's ideas about troublesome people in India connect themselves not altogether wrongly with the words Babu and Bengali. This is because a section of the population of Bengal have an extraordinary power of assimilating some phases of European life, and, above all, of giving expression to their views. But for this there is no reason why Bengal should play a greater part in Indian politics than Madras. In traditions, noble dynasties, and ancient causes it cannot compare with the North-West. Behar has venerable memories, but Bengal as a whole was not a political unit in the old Hindu days, and almost the first thing we hear of in history is the Mohammedan conquest at the end of the twelfth century. Few of the celebrated buildings of India are situated within its limits (partly, no doubt, because hardly any stone is to be found in these soft alluvial plains), and, despite the predominance of Hindus (except in the East) much of the architecture is Mohammedan. According to the latest dicta of ethnologists the mass of the population are not Aryan but Mongolo-Dravidian—that is to say, they are composed of an invading element which entered India from the north-east and amalgamated with the existing Dravidian population. The stricter Brahmans of the south and west look down upon their brethren of Bengal, considering that most of them are of doubtful lineage or at least that when they migrated into what was at that time a country deficient in Hindu civilisation they omitted many observances necessary for the preservation of purity of caste.

The character of Bengal and its inhabitants has been largely determined by its long and intimate contact with Europeans. It is true that it was not the part of India where Europeans first appeared, nor the scene of the more stirring conflicts. But it soon became the centre of the Company's commercial operations, and it was in Bengal that those operations first underwent the transformation from commerce into administration. It became, and



remained, the seat of the Governor-General. For Hindus and Mohammedans it had been, especially in the coast districts, a distant outpost and fringe of Empire. For the advancing British power it became the centre and foundation, all the more easily that there were so few old institutions to be moved out of the way. Calcutta is typical of this process, and merits the epithet of Anglo-Indian better than anything else in India. It has no history to look back on like Delhi and Agra before the advent of Europeans; it is not an emporium like Bombay, to which the commercial communities of India, such as Parsees, Jains, and Bohras, naturally gravitate, but simply a centre which has developed into a large town under English influence. Indian buildings of importance it has none; the native quarters present a not very creditable collection of unlovely and insanitary tenements. The larger edifices are all in the bureaucratic style—not palaces, mosques, and temples, but government houses, courts, and secretariats, diversified with statues of the sort of people one would expect to find inside them. Nor is wanting official patronage of art and science, as museums and colleges testify. Still, for the ordinary tourist, Calcutta has few objects of interest. One must be a civil servant or a politician to feel much enthusiasm about it. But one important quality it undoubtedly has. It has grown up with British Bengal, and is a real centre and metropolis for the province. A town of this sort is rare in India, where most cities have collected round a court or temple, and have their *raison d'être* in something within themselves, not in their surroundings. But Calcutta is a focus and meeting-place; here the thoughts and aspirations of the Bengali are centred, and its municipal and educational institutions, though far from perfect, are in touch with the life of the province as a whole. Also there are few large cities in Bengal, particularly in Bengal proper, excluding Behar. Calcutta, which contains, with its suburbs, over a million inhabitants, has no even approximate rivals. Its nearest competitor is Dacca, with less than a tenth of the population.

The Bengalis, who inhabit Bengal and congregate in Calcutta, have not, as a rule, found favour in European opinion. Their qualities are not showy or attractive. Indeed, when one tries to describe them it is surprising how many negatives one has to use. They are not warlike or courageous, and do not pretend to be so; they have little artistic sense, little power of organisation, and little aptitude for commerce or finance. But they have an amazing facility in everything that can be achieved by talking or writing. In the higher walks of literature they have not done much, though works like the novels of Bunkim Chandra Chatterjee, show merit, if not genius. Perhaps, as in many oriental countries, the pedantic and artificial character of the literary language renders excellence difficult. But as journalists and pamphleteers they have an astonishing fluency, and they furnish an unending supply of clerks and accountants. They would be ornaments of the pulpit did their other inclinations lead them towards Christianity; but they shine, above all, as lawyers. In that profession they have achieved the highest distinctions, and



compete with Europeans on an equal footing. Were Parliamentary institutions to be introduced into India, the Bengalis would probably attain whatever pre-eminence can be secured by oratory and skill in debate, qualities which are not necessarily accompanied by judgment or power of administration. Except for the want of commercial instinct, they may in many ways be compared to the modern Greeks, though Hellas has still some fragmentary heritage of Ares and Aphrodite which has not fallen to the lot of Bengal. Both nations have the same somewhat frothy and self-assertive patriotism, the same reliance on words and impotence in deeds.

With qualities such as these added to the usual mental acquisitiveness and retentive memory of the Hindu, it is not surprising that the Bengalis should have assimilated many European ideas. I say ideas rather than manners or institutions, for, though some of them have definitely abandoned caste and other Hindu institutions, and many have adopted in superficial matters European habits, it would appear that in essentials most of them remain Hindu in their methods of life. The communal family system, under which several generations live together and married sons have no establishment apart from their father's, still prevails among them, though showing signs of breaking up, and the dominant religion is not Christianity or even Hindu theism, such as that taught by the Brahma Samaj, but the worship of Kali, or the emotional teaching of Chaitanya. The basis of the national character seems to be something sensuous and sensitive, contrasting oddly with the utilitarian institutions of Europe, which it admires and imitates, and appealing less to the sympathy of Europeans than the more martial and direct temperament of the Rajputs and Sikhs. Besides, the Bengali has little picturesqueness. It is a quality of small practical value, perhaps, but it atones for a multitude of faults in those who possess it. A common dress among the educated middle-classes of Calcutta is a shirt worn outside the nether garments which take the place of trousers. It no doubt represents some development of an earlier tunic, but in its present form, with its cuffs, its front, and the place where the collar should be, it is simply a shirt, and when worn in conjunction with gold spectacles and European shoes it suggests that the process of dressing has been interrupted at a very inartistic stage. And much in the life of the educated natives of Calcutta shows a similarly inharmonious and even grotesque combination of eastern and western elements. It is hardly surprising, therefore, if Bengalis as a class do not find favour with Europeans, but yet one cannot help feeling that they are unfairly treated. We have come into the country, undertaken its administration, set ourselves up as masters and models, and then we have little good to say for the people who learn from us most readily. The fact is that British institutions and temperament at home and abroad are very different matters. The Englishman in India has, of course, a theoretical respect for the British Constitution, but he does not think of it in the same way as does the politically-minded stay-at-home citi-





zen. He has probably never voted in his life: Parliament fills a small place in his imagination and figures chiefly as a body of people who from time to time talk about foreign questions which they do not understand; when a Liberal Government is in power he regards the Cabinet and all Ministries as little less than anti-national bodies. On the other hand, the Army and military questions loom large in his mind. But what the Bengali has assimilated is not the ideas of the English in India but the ideas of English Liberals in England, particularly the aspect of them which appears in literature and speeches. He attaches an exaggerated importance to everything said in Parliament, and he cannot understand why Mr. Morley does not treat Bengal as if it were Manchester. And then comes Mr. Keir Hardie and confirms him in these views.

There is clearly here a diversity of temper containing all the elements of a serious misunderstanding which only waited for an occasion to come to a head. The occasion was furnished by the partition of Bengal, which seems a harmless administrative measure more likely to create discussion in official circles than to arouse popular discontent. It means the separation of the North-Eastern districts from the rest of Bengal and their formation, together with Assam, into a new province. It cannot be denied that these Eastern districts differ somewhat from the rest of Bengal, both in population and products. They are mainly composed of delta land, intersected by great rivers and a labyrinth of small streams. There are not many roads or railways, and communication is mostly by water—a method of transport easy enough to those accustomed to it, but not inviting to strangers. Further, these provinces are not on the way to anywhere in particular. There is no through route to Burma or Central Asia. It seems probable that part of the population of Bengal descended from the north in the unknown past, but the north-east has never been like the north-west, a highway of civilisation and a great military and political road. Hence it comes about that Eastern Bengal has always been somewhat of a backwater—remote, neglected, and in danger of stagnation. It was conquered by the lieutenants of Akbar in 1575, and the mass of the people were converted to Mohammedanism, but the majority of the landlords and upper classes remained Hindus. This distribution of creeds worked smoothly until recently. The Hindu is not, as a rule, aggressively fanatical. His time is largely occupied in protecting himself from pollution, but he has little desire to force his religion on others, and the lower classes, being not invaders, but Mohammedanised Indians, practised a surreptitious veneration for the Hindu deities. The Hindu landlord also could associate with his tenants as a superior. Although the humblest caste-observing Hindu could not eat food in the house of his Mohammedan master, there is no reason why a Hindu Zemindar should not give a feast to his Mohammedan tenants and the latter enjoy it with a good conscience. But there were also possibilities of trouble. In many parts of the world the population of deltas is enervated and as soft as the soil they tread on, but



not so in Lower Bengal, where the peasantry are independent and inclined to be turbulent. This may be partly the result of their Mohammedan training and their comparative affluence, for a moderate amount of labour enables them to raise a crop of jute bringing in a sum which is large according to rural Indian standards. The circulation of a considerable amount of money in a somewhat wild district encourages robbery and dacoity. It is not easy to police this network of streams, or to apply the Arms Act effectively. Crimes of violence are frequent, and the political agitator finds an armed and disorderly element more easily than in other districts.



## VI.—DACCA.

In going from Calcutta to Dacca the traveller is soon aware that he is passing into another country. The train starts at night, and even at the railway-station one notices a number of Europeans whose hats and speech are not as those of ordinary officials. These are jute merchants. Jute, which provides the staple industry of Eastern Bengal, is a tall green plant, and grows in watery places. It is used to make gunny bags, of which the world seems to require an enormous quantity. The industry is comparatively modern. The said bags used to be made of Russian hemp and flax, but when during the Crimean war the supply of these materials failed, jute came to the front and has held the market ever since. The cultivation of this plant does not seem to inspire that calm which one associates with agricultural pursuits. Its growth may be unruffled and deliberate, but its price fluctuates with unbucolic rapidity, and obliges those interested in it to visit Calcutta frequently and inspect the market.

Next morning one arrives at Goalundo, a collection of a few sheds on the bank of a mighty flood of yellow water which is nothing less than the Brahmaputra and the main stream of the Ganges combined. Water is here so much the stronger and more active element that no solid and permanent buildings are constructed, because from time to time the flood in its caprice changes its course and sweeps its banks away. Its present channel dates only from the last century, and has unfavourably affected the prosperity of Dacca, the capital of Eastern Bengal, which was not originally divorced from the rest of the province by this rush of waters. But, in justice to the rivers of Bengal, it must be said that if they destroy land, they also make it. They bring down the rich soil, which enables the province to grow almost inexhaustible crops, and they carry the produce of this soil to the sea without need of roads or railways.

Dacca lies on a backwater, with a long, not unpicturesque, frontage of warehouses and mansions, among which stand up a few pointed towers like European steeples—a form of architecture rare in India. There is an old fort looking over the river and some tombs built by an ancient Viceroy of the Moghuls, Shaista Khan, but most of the houses are in that deplorable style



of plastered and pinnacled Hindu architecture which when new looks like wedding-cake and afterwards like biscuit soaked in water, as it sinks into mouldy old age, drenched by the copious rains which deluge these regions. The outskirts of the town show a promise of something better. There is a fine new college, and preparations are being made to construct a palace for the Lieutenant-Governor, but on the whole whatever beauty Dacca possesses depends less on the works of man than on the changing play of tropical light on sheets of water, big trees, and green fields. Wherever one looks one sees rivers, ponds, and lakes, and a boat progressing across the green often shows that a seeming meadow is really grass growing out of water. Yet the country is by no means a swampy waste. The flood water is drained off after the rains, and leaves not marshes but a thick deposit of silt. Statistics show that the population is surprisingly numerous and denser than that of Belgium. The census states that in one district it attains the extraordinary average of 1,787 per square mile. Wherever there are a few yards of *terra firma* one sees men and their dwellings. The people have not the gentle and deferential manners of the ordinary mild Hindu, but are brisker and rougher in their movements. One has only to watch the press and bustle in the streets and the conflict among the riverside porters for the possession of passengers' luggage. The majority of the population are cultivators, but Dacca was once celebrated for delicate industries, which have of late declined and almost disappeared—gold filigree work, and especially the manufacture of fine muslins and gossamer, such as those called woven water or evening dew, fabrics so thin and transparent that legends (which in coarser times would probably have been used as advertisements) relate how princesses were put to death by their irate lords for having the indecency to appear in a scanty costume of only twenty layers. But it appears that there is a greater demand for gunny bags in the present age.

Another sign of Dacca's great position in the past is the presence of Armenian and Greek merchants, remnants of once considerable colonies who carried on a brisk trade with Persia and the Levant. But, though the town has now lost some of its importance as a manufacturing and trading centre, and seems to lie somewhat apart from the main movement of great events and ideas in India, the district, and indeed all Eastern Bengal, is by no means wanting in prosperity. Of late the population has grown with surprising rapidity, in consequence partly of an increased birth-rate and partly of the immigration of labourers, while the cultivation of jute has more than doubled in the last twenty years.

This is the region which has now been separated from the rest of Bengal, together with the port of Chittagong and parts of the Delta of the Ganges proper, including Barisal, where some of the most violent disturbances took place. Much has been written about this celebrated partition, which was accomplished two years ago; but no doubt the most remarkable thing about it is that it should have encountered such a feeling of provincial patriotism and sense of the unity of Bengal. Accepting that feeling as a fact in the case, we must, I think, admit that there was a good deal to





be said on both sides, or rather it is a question about which people may hold two legitimate but antagonistic views, according to the sentimental bias with which they approach it. The chief argument of the Calcutta orators was that the division was a blow to the unity and aspirations of the Bengali people, analogous to the partition of Poland. This complaint was in many ways exaggerated, for, as already mentioned, Bengal had never been a political unit and in Mohammedan times was divided into three provinces. Still, of recent years Calcutta has become a great centre, a resort for the brains and money of all Bengal, and naturally the larger the area it draws from, and the fewer its rivals, the greater its importance and resources are likely to be. The growth of Chittagong might seriously threaten its commercial supremacy. Also there is another aspect of the matter which seems momentous to Indians. Whereas in Bengal as a whole the Hindus are in the majority, they are outnumbered by the Mohammedans in Eastern Bengal, and therefore the partition means an accession of strength to the Mohammedan side by creating a new province in which they are predominant. In Dacca the excess of Mohammedans over Hindus is not considerable, but in Maimensingh, Tipperah, and Chittagong they are in the great majority, and in some districts form 80 per cent. of the population. In view of the jealousy between Hindus and Mohammedans and the radical difference in their ways of regarding many questions, it is easy to understand the objections to the change. But Government is clearly not bound to support Hindus against Moslems. Its first duty and profession is to be impartial, and it is not clear that it does wrong or exceeds its just powers if for assignable reasons it alters the existing distribution of parties. Further, it was urged in Calcutta that different land-laws would inevitably grow up in the new province, and that this would prove a hardship to proprietors holding land in both Eastern and Western Bengal, as many do. It was also felt very strongly, though the argument does not make a good popular appeal, that the creation of a new province would ultimately entail the creation of a separate High Court, which would mean the diversion of a considerable volume of business and fees from the Calcutta pleaders, who form the bulk of educated native opinion in that city.

One of the main arguments advanced by the Indian Government in favour of the partition was that the province had become unwieldy and larger than one man could supervise. There is much truth in this, and yet I think the reasoning is plausible rather than convincing, for in the same way it might easily be shown that India is too large to be administered by one Viceroy, and one can hardly doubt that if the Indian Government had determined to keep Bengal undivided and intact they would have found some other method of relieving the administrative congestion. Far stronger, to my mind, is the argument that the eastern districts of Bengal suffered from being a mere annex and fringe of a large province. They were two years ago not only undeveloped but, except for the jute industry, in the first stages of decadence. As



I have explained, they are out of the way, ill provided with communications, and not particularly attractive or interesting. But they have considerable commercial importance. Dacca has in it the makings of a great city, and Chittagong is said to be one of the best harbours of India, far better than Calcutta, which is only accessible by a long voyage up a troublesome tidal river. A country so neglected but with such possibilities clearly required independence and the stimulus of competition; nor can the Government of the Viceroy be blamed for taking the larger view and putting the interests of India above the interests of Calcutta. But there was probably another motive, as little talked of as the Calcutta pleader's fear of losing business, but as weighty. The Government cannot have been blind to the fact that the general ulterior effect of the partition must be to weaken the power of the Bengali agitators. That the movement which I call, for want of a better word, agitation has not been treated with the sympathy which might have rendered it harmless I admit; but it is much more obvious that it is in many of its manifestations seditious and even anti-social, for the utterances of some Bengalis, if taken seriously, can hardly be construed as anything but incitement to massacre. And even those who are most desirous to give Indian ideas fair and free play may doubt whether the predominance of the Bengali style is an advantage, and whether we shall best preserve the good which is to be found in native Indian ways of life and modes of thought—which should surely be our aim—by the wholesale introduction of British institutions which this school seems to recommend. Not for the preservation of British dominion, but in the interests of India itself, and in the interests of the world at large, which is impoverished by the obliteration of any distinctive type of civilisation, it is to be hoped that educated Indians will learn to develop the special ideas and institutions of their own country rather than to copy the West. It was perhaps a mistake when it was decided in 1835 to make European studies the basis of higher teaching. Little of beauty or interest has been produced as a result. Undiscerning imitation is combined with an equally undiscerning assertion of independence, and those Hindus whose programme is India for the Indians seem to be precisely the class which has least of the true Indian flavour.

However, it is quite clear how it came about, that some aspects of the partition, such as the probable decrease of Calcutta's importance as a business and social centre, and the weakening of the most obstreperous native party, called forth a serious popular outcry, and it appears, too, that the manner in which the division was made was unhappy, and gave ground for plausible complaint. The whole business attracted little general attention in England at the time, but the almost universal impression in India—among Europeans as well as among Hindus—is that the Home Government seemed to promise that the proposed measure should be the subject of a debate in Parliament and then let it stand over, and finally passed it without discussion.



## VII.—THE PARTITION OF BENGAL AND THE SWADESHI BOYCOTT.

The partition of Bengal supplied the simmering discontent of Babudom with a definite grievance. The protests against it took the form not only of speeches and newspaper articles, but of a political association, the Swadeshi or patriotic movement, which initiated a boycott of British goods, and requires from its adherents a vow that they will use only articles of native manufacture. It is an interesting parallel to the boycott of American goods which prevailed in South China last year, and the two examples show that the idea of an economic attack on Europeans has become familiar to Oriental nations. Somewhat similar, but more extreme in its ideals, is the movement known as Swaraj, political autonomy or independence, championed by Mr. Bepin Chandra Pal, editor of the *Bande Mataram*. The aim of this writer is not to give Indians a larger share in the administration, nor to assimilate that administration to any of the European Constitutions, but rather to substitute for the present system at any cost some—or perhaps one should say any—form of native Indian government. He is the author of such sayings as that of all despotisms a benevolent despotism is the worst, because it makes people forget that it is a despotism, and that under existing conditions in India good government must be absolutely opposed to the promotion of self-government. This sort of logic pushed to its limits without fear of paradox has not obtained many declared adherents among educated Hindus, for their aspirations are largely directed towards a greater measure of representative government and a more liberal constitution. The Swadeshi movement is, comparatively speaking, reasonable, and addresses itself to practical issues. It has a double character. First of all it is a political protest against the partition of Bengal. As such it has been obviously ineffectual, and is probably doomed to extinction. But it has also an economic side, inasmuch as it is a protest against the decadence of native industries and an attempt to revive them. As such it can hardly fail to have the sympathy of everyone specially interested in India, for the most striking feature in the Indian economic position at the present day is the small part played by manufactures and industries. India is an enormous producer and exporter of raw materials and food-stuffs, but for the ordinary articles of everyday



life, for such homely necessities as cotton clothes, metal vessels, oil, and matches, it depends on the foreign manufacturer to an extent probably unparalleled among civilised countries. Only 20 per cent. of the exports consist of manufactured goods, and about 2,288,000,000 yards of cotton are imported, which allows between seven and eight yards per head to the whole population.

It must be admitted that in this matter the conduct of the British Government has not been beyond criticism. In 1894, when the value of the rupee was very low and a deficit of 168 lakhs had to be faced, a general duty of 5 per cent. on imports was imposed. Cotton goods were at first excepted, but this aroused great opposition in India. Then the 5 per cent. duty was applied to imported cotton goods, and at the same time, to meet the objections of Lancashire manufacturers, a corresponding excise duty was imposed on certain classes of cotton yarns produced in Indian mills. But this arrangement raised further objections, and in 1896 a uniform duty of  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. was levied on all woven goods, whether imported or manufactured in India. The arrangement can be justified to economists as an instance of a non-preferential tariff more readily than to Indian manufacturers, and a statesman might plead the very complex character of the British Empire and the need of satisfying Lancashire as well as India. But it is natural that those whose first consideration is the welfare of India should feel aggrieved if Indian cotton manufactures are hampered by the imposition of a duty which in most countries is applied exclusively to foreign goods. In spite of all explanations and justifications, the fact remains that this excise in practice seems to discourage the industries which admittedly require most encouragement. As has been pointed out in the recent controversy, the principle which the Swadeshis have tried to enforce by an anti-British boycott received the sanction of the Indian Government in a resolution passed in 1883, which stated that this Government was "desirous to give the utmost encouragement to every effort to substitute for articles now obtained from Europe articles of bona fide local manufacture or indigenous origin," and Lord Curzon, speaking at Delhi in 1902, used similar but more eloquent language about Indian arts and handicrafts. Even more weighty is the testimony of the Famine Commissioners of 1880 to the importance of the question. "No remedy for present evils can be complete," they say, "which does not include the introduction of a diversity of occupations through which the surplus population may be drawn from agricultural pursuits and led to find the means of subsistence in manufactures or some such employment." Yet twelve years later, in 1902, we find the official Census Report for Bengal stating that "the introduction of machinery in Europe not only killed the export trade but flooded the country with cheap piece-goods and has so seriously crippled the indigenous manufacture that many persons belonging to the weaver caste have been driven to abandon the loom for the plough. The manufacture of silk also is decadent."

It is hard, therefore, to blame the principles of the Swadeshi leaders, however much we may dislike their methods and the vio-





lence of their language. It is an absurd exaggeration to say that England has ruined India economically. The whole economic and commercial growth of Calcutta and Bombay is due to European influence, especially the jute industry; and native manufactures, though not as flourishing as we could wish to see them, must be growing in spite of the excise duty on cotton, for it is stated that the amount produced by this excise rose from 6 lakhs in 1895-6 to 18 lakhs in 1902-3, while in the same period the yield of the duty on imported cotton fell from 116 lakhs to 95 lakhs.

There is some doubt as to the success of the Swadeshi boycott; for though after its commencement the amount of imports began to show a decrease in some items, this result may have been due to depression and consequent diminution of purchasing-power as much as to abstention from conviction, and it is noticeable that the consumption of imported cigarettes, which would be specially affected by the habits of the class who form the bulk of the Swadeshis, showed no reduction.

Connected with the Swadeshi movement is a noticeable educational phenomenon—namely, that schools financed entirely by natives and not dependent on Government are springing up all over Bengal. Physical culture also claims attention, and this was the origin of the volunteer bands which are now practically part of the Swadeshi organisation. A laudable desire to improve their feeble physique led some Bengalis to establish and frequent gymnasiums or drill-schools, known as akharas. The fashion spread and considerable numbers of the youth were enrolled in these companies. Natives of India are not allowed to carry firearms, but the volunteers practised various quasi-military exercises armed with stout sticks bearing brass tips, which, though not exactly deadly weapons, are effective enough for breaking heads. It is chiefly with these bands of volunteers that are associated the breaches of the peace which have brought the name of Swadeshi into disrepute in official circles. Attempts were made to force the Mohammedan population of Eastern Bengal to join the boycott, and were resisted by force. For instance, the riots at Jamalpur were due to such an attempt. A branch of the Swadeshi organisation, supported by all the influential Hindus of the locality, endeavoured to prevent the Mohammedans from buying imported goods, and most rashly—for the Mohammedans were in the majority—provoked a disturbance over the purchase of a cap. The followers of the Prophet defeated the volunteers. Riot and panic ensued, but the casualties were few. In other cases antagonism to Mohammedanism, unnaturally accentuated in the excitement raised by the partition, moved the Hindus to untimely and ill-judged piety. Hindu money-lenders tried to make their Mohammedan clients repay their debts in part by donations to Hindu temples, and this in its turn prompted the exasperated Moslems to acts of sacrilege and the desecration of the very buildings to which they had unwillingly contributed. Lawlessness became general, and rioting not rare. How far it ever really took the form of deliberate attacks on Europeans from political motives is not clear, but with the general increase of



crimes of violence assaults on Europeans also became more frequent. Many districts of Eastern Bengal had a bad record for such crimes, particularly for railway robbery, and this became more and more common in the recent period of unrest, partly, no doubt, from the general prevalence of a turbulent spirit, but the pleasure of assaulting Europeans may also have been a factor. On the line near Comilla passengers were advised by the guard to close the shutters of first-class carriages (in which Europeans are generally to be found), because, for one reason or another, stones were frequently thrown through the windows at night. In quite another part of Bengal—namely, Behar—much attention was attracted by what is known as the Bloomfield case. Four men were sentenced to death for causing the death of Mr. Bloomfield in an agrarian riot, but on appeal the High Court reduced the capital sentence to imprisonment. The whole incident produced an unfortunate effect on the feelings of the planters in a district in which the relations between Europeans and Indians had been unusually intimate and friendly.

The anniversary celebration of the Swadeshi which I saw at Dacca on August 7 last was a very tame affair—merely an illumination of the bazaar, which was decorated with Union Jacks. In their desire to have flags the demonstrators had forgotten that these particular emblems were not very appropriate to the occasion and the cause. It would seem, too, that the celebration held the same day in Calcutta was not attended by as many as in former years. Opinions differ as to whether the movement is likely to be persistent and effect anything. It has, I think, a real hold on the sympathies of the educated classes, but against this must be set the fact that its adherents are largely students—young men passing through a period of transition, who forget their college notions when they enter a profession. And there is this initial contradiction in their attitude, that whereas Swadeshi bids them cut off all connexion with the Government, the chief desire of most is to have a Government appointment.

But though the most recent performances of the Swadeshis do not indicate that they are increasing in numbers or efficiency of organisation, but rather the contrary, it is clear that the discontented and turbulent spirit is neither cowed nor exorcised. The papers continue to report attacks on Europeans and wholesale assaults on the police. No evidence is forthcoming against the perpetrators of these open acts of violence. This is important, because it shows that, either from fear or, as is more probable, from sympathy, the mass of the people are unwilling to appear as witnesses against the rioters.

The Swadeshi movement has also a religious aspect, and it is interesting to find that it is associated not, as one might expect, with the Brahma Samaj or with Europeanised theism, but with the cult of the Goddess Kali, a bloodthirsty deity worshipped with animal sacrifices. It was even contended in the English Press that the Swadeshi hymn "Bande mataram, I salute the mother," is an invocation to Kali. It would appear that the first words are taken from a novel of Babu Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, in which a band of armed religious mendicants (a pheno-



menon which appeared in India in the eighteenth century as in eastern Europe in the middle ages) are represented as killing a detachment of Sepoys and an English officer, and singing a hymn of triumph with this beginning. But I have been assured by Hindus that as a political song the words mean merely "I salute my motherland," and it is difficult to see what other political sense they could have. But no doubt the idea of the murderous character of the terrible goddess is present in the minds of some fanatics, and one orator in Calcutta called upon his audience worthily to celebrate the festival of Kali and make her an offering of white—here came a dramatic pause—goats. Equally disquieting are the eulogies of Sivaji and of political assassination pronounced in Poona by Mr. Tilak some years ago. They were followed by the assassination of two British officers and by the imprisonment of Mr. Tilak for his inflammatory harangue.

This is perhaps the place to mention the Indian National Congress, a more moderate and law-abiding form of political agitation. It met first in 1885, in Bombay, and assembles annually in December in some large city. The Government of India have consistently refused to accord it any recognition, but it has had the encouragement and assistance of various unofficial Europeans. It has not accomplished much, and its last meeting did not give proof of great vitality, but these manifestations must not be judged by their definite results or be thought to be without significance because they fail in their immediate objects. They are important so far as they express and influence a widespread current of opinion, and they may do that even if they decay or are transformed *re infecta*. The National Congress is not representative in one sense. Its object—or the object of the majority—is to establish in India the democratic constitution of England. Such an aim is unintelligible to the mass of the people of India and distasteful to many who do understand it—to extreme Nationalists as well as to Maharajas. The latest news is that the Congress is distracted by violent disputes between the Extremists and Moderates. This seems to me not so much a sign of weakness as a proof that it really inspires interest among the educated classes, and is becoming the arena of genuine political passions.



### VIII.—INDIAN LOYALTY.

In previous articles I have outlined the manifestations of unrest which have occurred in India. We have found them to be widespread and provoked by many causes. We have now to inquire whether the people of India have any general grievances which will serve as an explanation of the whole series of disturbances, and prove capable of redress. In dealing with this question one cannot treat the population of India as a united whole. The educated and uneducated classes differ considerably not only in their views about the British Government, but in the extent to which they have formed any views at all about it. And to these broad natural divisions must be added distinctions peculiar to India, such as Hindus and Moslems and various geographical and linguistic groupings.

Some of the best sections of Indian Society are distinctly favourable to our government, and are loyal in the full British sense. Such are the Parsis and most Rajas or native princes. The Parsis are a comparatively small colony of Persian Zoroastrians numbering about 94,000, who left their country after the Mohammedan conquest and took refuge in western India. They have no military aptitudes, but a genius for many branches of commerce and finance, and a considerable power of assimilating European civilisation without thereby destroying the picturesqueness of their own national life. They have clearly nothing to fear from British dominion, which secures them everything they want: complete religious toleration, free scope for their abilities, and an invigorating contact with western ideas. The Rajas, too, as a whole have reason to be content with the present system. Many thrones in Rajputana would have fallen but for British support in the eighteenth century. We proved our good-will and honesty by the restoration of Mysore to its native rulers in 1881, when its retention as British territory would have created no surprise. It is also the aristocratic class which in associating with Europeans feels the least friction. They are well received when they go to England, and in India their position secures them a courtesy which, it must be confessed, is not extended to the educated middle-class Hindu. There is therefore no reason to mistrust the profession of loyalty made by the princes of India from





time to time in print and elsewhere. They are a staff and shield to the Government in many domestic difficulties, and their value would be doubled in any period of foreign complications. But still, in estimating the political importance of their loyalty, it must be remembered that there are huge and populous tracts where there are no native princes, and also that Rajas have their grievances. They need supervision, but dislike being supervised. They are rarely all in harmony with one another, so that there is reason to apprehend that if some of them are extremely loyal this will in itself be sufficient to impel others in a contrary direction.

Perhaps we expect a little too much from India in the way of loyalty. It is a wonderful thing that we should have conquered the country and hold it with so small an effort and so little opposition. For the most part we neither acquired it in the past nor hold it now by the direct exercise of military force, but still it is obvious to all that we are a body of governing aliens who assert our right to dispose of the chief interests of the country. To do this without incurring general hatred is a fine performance; in the recent unrest the serious point is not the quantity of active discontent, but that, as our rule depends so largely on assent, a very little discontent may be embarrassing. But when we expect—as our public utterances seem to imply—loyalty, gratitude, and active devotion, I think we are going a little too far. Why on earth should the mass of the Indian people be grateful to us for having conquered India? The student of history sees, of course, that the advent of the British was a blessing. The more violent native patriots, and any Europeans who are foolish enough to support them, may be recommended to study the annals of India during the eighteenth century, and they will find that, far from destroying independence, we introduced order, and that the India of that day was a carcase torn by contending jackals and vultures, a series of tottering and disintegrating States attacked by rebels, brigands, mercenaries, and adventurers of every description, who afforded little promise of constructive power had any of them gained the day. Our rule was an element of union and discipline invaluable for the education of the country. But all that was a long time ago, and one cannot expect it to be a living memory among the people. Gratitude to teachers and masters is a middle-aged sentiment. One thinks kindly of one's preceptors after forty, but not when one is still at school, and India is as yet *in statu pupillari*.

Loyalty towards government or monarchs in the European sense is not a sentiment common in India or Mohammedan countries. In such countries a sovereign is regarded as one to whom heaven has given an exceptional power and right to take from the people what he wants, and the chief sentiment he inspires is a hope that he will not want too much. A military leader or a prince with religious attributes may succeed in awakening personal enthusiasm or veneration, but most rulers of India since the dawn of history have been accepted by the mass of their subjects with resignation as part of the inscrutable order of things. The chief desire of the ryot is to pay as few taxes as possible. How the Government spends the money it takes is not his business. Of its aims and methods he has little idea. Municipal administration is



not much known outside the large towns and the life of the village communities, though a perfect example of local self government in its own way is far removed from any system to which we apply that name. So it is not reasonable to expect either enthusiasm or a thorough understanding of our administration from the millions of India. The quiet obedience generally rendered is all we can look for, perhaps all that we deserve. And even when among the educated classes the Government receives severe criticism, I do not know that we have any right to be indignant, for is not political criticism open and acrimonious in England? By a happy distinction between the Government of the day on one side and the Crown and Constitution on the other, criticism is able to have full play without seeming to us either seditious or disloyal. But a native of India reading the abuse which has been heaped by the Press on both the present and the late Cabinet is likely to come to the conclusion that they both desired to ruin their country and were only prevented by their imbecility, which rendered them unable to do anything at all. It is not surprising if the educated and travelled Hindu conceives the idea of writing similar criticism, nor is it quite plain what should be the attitude of the Government of India when attacked. Is it a legitimate target for abuse, like a British Government, or does some of the sanctity of the Crown extend to Viceregal institutions?

The grievances of the masses in India are inarticulate, and they naturally disappear when stated and analysed by Europeans. British dominion was preceded by that of the Moghuls, so that the idea of being ruled by aliens not professing the Hindu religion had become familiar. If we were to inquire of Indian villages whether they have any complaints, we should probably find that they are preoccupied with minute financial questions concerned with fractions of a farthing, involving hardships great in their eyes, which may or may not be avoidable. The grievances of the Punjab Canal Colonists were largely of this class, and a more serious example of the same kind was the salt-tax, now happily reduced. It has been decreased by 60 per cent. since 1903, and the rise in the consumption of salt seems to show that it was an impost which prevented the people from buying one of the necessaries of life. Another grievance has often been mentioned to me by Indians—namely, the petty tyranny and corruption of the native police. It is alleged that they extort blackmail, and harass those whom they dislike by secret adverse reports on their conduct, and in extreme cases trump up charges against them. One would like to sweep away this whole system of secret police, but that would probably necessitate the introduction of many restrictions on individual freedom which do not at present exist. One has only to read the Indian Penal Code, with its provisions against torturing prisoners, obtaining depositions by threats and force, &c., to see that the existence of a dangerous side in the character of the police is fully recognised. Similarly one is told in Calcutta that in spite of Government regulations all the cabs at Howrah station have to pay toll to the police, and so liable are Indians of the lower class to abuse any little authority that may be given them that even the



agents of such an excellent institution as the Society for Preventing Cruelty to Animals become blackmailers, and in return for payment allow animals to be worked in an unfit condition. All this undoubtedly offers a wide field for reform, but it should be added that this spying and blackmailing is not an invention of modern bureaucracy, but a very ancient Indian institution, though perhaps none the more palatable for that, since people generally grumble not at the inventors of a system, but at those who are working it at the time when its effects are felt to be disagreeable. The Indian policeman is evolved out of the watchman in the ancient self-governing village. This functionary was expected not only to keep watch at night but to report to the headman all arrivals and departures, and suspicious persons or circumstances; to know the character of everyone in the village, and use this knowledge for detecting theft and other crimes.

Probably the most dangerous, as well as the most unreasonable, grievances of the lower classes are connected with epidemics. There can be little doubt that millions of them believe that the plague is deliberately disseminated by the Government, and, what is worse, that some of the educated classes who ought to know better, play upon this notion in the hope of encouraging a spirit of rebellion. When we reflect with satisfaction that the Indian Empire is rooted in justice and bears flowers of prosperity, it is well to remember that it may be shaken not only by mismanagement but by crazy notions and superstitions like this.


One of the greatest authorities on India, Sir Alfred Lyall, has pointed out in a remarkable passage how the British Government, by undertaking duties usually laid upon the gods, has assumed, in the eyes of the Indian peasantry, responsibilities of which it never dreamt. Formerly public disasters were shifted on to the shoulders of the gods or their priests. "Now, the British Government, having thrown aside these lightning conductors, is much more exposed than a native ruler would be to shocks from famines or other widespread misfortunes, and, in fact, the native newspapers already indicate that the tendency to cry out upon Government when the world goes wrong is actually becoming immeasurable. Cholera, famine, and great sea inundations, when they are not made the text of invectives against the British Government, do at least, in some confused way, bring upon it great discredit . . . from the dim feeling that the Government has undertaken the gods' business and is breaking down." ("Asiatic Studies," Vol. I., p. 93.)

This passage will perhaps seem fanciful to some, and I admit it used to do so to me, but it is completely justified by the feeling which even the Secretary of State, speaking in the House of Commons, cannot deny is prevalent in India. It is a most instructive lesson in Hindu psychology though it costs dear. Formerly, argues the Indian villager, kings used to worship the gods, and the gods used to send and remove pestilence or famine. The English Government ignores the gods, and looks after these things itself. When the gods let plague continue, it was not because they could not stop it, but because, for some mysterious



reason of their own, they wished it to continue. The inference suggests itself that it is the same with the British Government. The village mind knows nothing of the cautious language of science, of the measures which are best "in the present state of our knowledge" or of "working hypotheses." If you can't stop the plague, it means simply that you won't. And why not? Then the villager's notions of statecraft and political economy come in. It seems to him natural that the Government should come to the conclusion that there are too many people in the world, and that its medical department should suggest the diffusion of the plague as a means of getting rid of them. But in one point the analogy between government and the gods does not hold entirely good. It is no use rebelling against the gods, but rebellion against government is more effectual. It is not met with inexorable calm, but at least flusters the upper spheres and attracts attention.

Another similar idea is that the Government poisons wells, and a certain Dyal Swami was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for creating a scare of this kind in the Punjab. Famines also lend themselves to the same treatment, and in a country like India, where the population depend mainly on agriculture and agriculture depends mainly on rain, the periodical recurrence of famines is inevitable. The present reports as to agricultural prospects in the North-West are alarming. The danger that ignorance may in times of suffering develop a disaffection and panic is enormous, and if any enemies of government desire to suggest and increase such panic by their misrepresentations they are likely to have only too many opportunities.





### IX.—GRIEVANCES REAL AND IMAGINARY.

When we turn to the grievances of the educated classes in India we find ourselves dealing with ideas of a very different order. Some of the grievances are real enough; those which we think imaginary or based on misunderstandings are the result not of mental workings which we find it difficult to follow, like the villagers' tendency to hold Government responsible for plague, but arise from a great, though superficial, knowledge of European institutions, and a perverid desire to imitate them, into which enter largely self-esteem and the fear of seeming to be inferior.

It has been said that all popular political questions rest upon social ones, and that in Great Britain, for instance, many religious and educational difficulties would disappear if Nonconformist ministers were once recognised as having the same social status as the Clergy of the Established Church. In India there can be no doubt that social differentiation between Europeans and natives, emphasised often unconsciously by the one and keenly felt by the other, is the source of that feeling which inflames and vitalises seemingly unreasonable movements. The upper classes, as I have already pointed out, are the most happily situated in this regard. In India their position secures them respect, and when they visit Europe they are lionised, or at least receive great courtesy. Those who are most unhappily situated are educated Indians of the middle classes who have visited England. There they are almost invariably received with sympathy and civility, and often are treated with far more attention than the rank they have in their own country requires. They learn not only how Europeans treat one another, but how they treat strangers to whom they wish to be polite. But when the Hindu traveller returns to India he finds that he is not treated by the average Englishman, and still less by the average Englishwoman, as he was treated in England. In Europe the white majority, too, unaccustomed to contact with other races to have any pride of colour or fear of familiarity, are amiably anxious to put the stranger at his ease. In India the white minority are penetrated by the feeling that they are a small dominant caste which must at any cost preserve



its position by asserting its superiority—a feeling, it may be observed, which is really far more Indian than English, for in many ways the attitude of the Anglo-Indian is exactly that of the higher castes. But the travelled Indians have discovered and the untravelled have learned from them that such assertions of superiority are not usual between the different classes of Europeans, and that the supercilious attitude of Anglo-Indians implies arrogant and exclusive claims which are quite incompatible with English ideas of common citizenship.

And the evil does not seem in a good way to be healed, for naturally the Europeans who offend most in this respect are not those of the highest position and best manners, but the lower class, for, as they say in the Southern States of America, a man who is proud of his colour has generally nothing else to be proud of. But the increase of travelling and of communication between India and the British Isles increases the number of Europeans of all sorts who come into contact with natives. And of course the recent disturbances, and—to distribute the blame fairly—let us add the tone of many native newspapers, have not failed to embitter the existing dislike of Anglo-Indians for the educated classes and to increase the use of language offensive to them. How prevalent and how unwise this irritating language is was pointed out by the Bishop of Lahore in a letter written to the *Civil and Military Gazette* last August.

If one were to ask an educated Hindu what is the principal grievance of the class he represents, he would probably reply that they consider they have not a sufficient share in the government of the country, that their opinion is not sufficiently consulted and that it does not receive the weight it deserves. This grievance has two aspects—the demand for a more representative form of government and the demand for more posts open to Hindus. It is not unduly cynical, I think, to say that the latter rather than the former is the place where the shoe really pinches and the foot itches. In numbers the distribution of posts gives the Indian no ground for complaint, and since 1867 the number of Indian officials has steadily increased. The Civil Service is divided into three branches: the Indian Civil Service, recruited in England, but open to natives of India who may compete for it in England (that is to say, we insist that natives filling the higher posts must have been to England and have a practical acquaintance with European methods), and the Provincial and Subordinate Services recruited in India and from natives of India. The total number of Government servants drawing salaries under £800 a year in 1903 was 26,908 (I take the figures from Lord Curzon's sixth Budget speech), of whom only 5,205 were Europeans, while 21,800 were inhabitants of the country, 5,420 being Eurasians and 16,283 natives. But in most departments the higher posts are not open to natives of India, at any rate in practice, and the statistics for the salaries over £800 give a very different result. They numbered 1,370 in 1903, and of these appointments 1,263 were filled by Europeans, 15 by Eurasians, and 92 by natives. A comparison with Russian administration (a



comparison which should be used cautiously, for the conditions prevailing in the Russian Asiatic possession are quite different from those in our own) suggests that we have imperfectly mastered the gentle art which may be variously described as courtesy or humbug. In Russian Asia orientals often receive posts of dignity where they are powerless. In the Indian service all posts have their face value. If a Hindu is a judge he is a real judge, exactly like his European colleague. If Hindus are not thought capable of holding high executive posts they simply do not get them. It is in the judicial department that the equality between natives and Europeans is most complete. There are native judges of the High Court, who are universally admitted by Europeans to be in no way inferior to their British colleagues either in intelligence or integrity. In executive posts the equality is less conspicuous; no Indian has yet risen above the position of collector, and even those who have attained it are few. Success in the judicial department does not quite compensate for this failure, for it must be confessed that in common estimation an executive or military appointment ranks above one which is judicial, educational, or scientific. And everyone feels that these posts, which imply the exercise of an authority which for the moment is irresponsible, though it may be subject to subsequent correction, demand qualities which are not those most frequent in the Indians of to-day. It is easier to imagine a Hindu as member of the Viceroy's Council than as Lieutenant-Governor; and though many Hindus may clamour for high executive positions for themselves or for their countrymen in the abstract, yet when there is a question of appointing a Hindu as collector to a district the various sections of Indian society often let it be known that they would feel more confidence in a European. Indians do not as a rule inspire one another with the conviction that they are, *mutatis mutandis*, exempt from those evils which appear in a gross and vulgar form in the Indian police.

In the Army it would appear that the Indian is even farther from competing with Europeans on equal terms. If I am correctly informed, British soldiers do not salute native officers, and the highest native officers do not rank above the most junior European officers. A civilian can hardly venture to criticise such arrangements, but, if they are correctly stated and are considered necessary, it is a remarkable instance of the compound nature of our rule in Asia, which, though in the main a government by consent and co-operation, has inconsistent and dangerous phases in which it appears as a domination of one race over another. However, the ways of military men are not as those of civilians, and there is little community of blood or interests between the sections from whom native officers are drawn and those which supply the ordinary educated and politically minded Hindu. But, as the troubles in the Punjab have shown, a grievance which has absolutely nothing to do with the agitator may be turned by him into a dangerous thing.

One of the commonplaces of Indian political talk is the tribute—usually assessed at about thirty millions sterling—which India is



said to pay to England annually. Such payments, it is averred, bleed the country and produce an impoverishment resulting in periodical plague and famine. This view is frequently ventilated by Indians in the Press, and has even been held and expressed by Europeans, such as the late Mr. W. Digby. Everyone is ready to blame Europeans who preach such ideas to natives, but I may observe parenthetically that it is most unfortunate that those who hold sound doctrine make so little effort to impart it to educated Indians. It is not sufficient to flood the country with Blue-books. Facts and views about the economic, financial, and political condition of India ought to be put before them in a sympathetic and palatable form. But hardly any effort has been made to do this, except by Lord Curzon. The critics of Government can get into touch with Indians: its apologists hardly try to do so. As regards this "tribute," or Home Charges, as the Indian Government prefer to call it, it would appear that nearly £18,000,000 chargeable on the Indian revenue for the year is expended in England (the figures are for 1902-3). The greater part of this sum is simply payment for capital and materials received from this country, and the charge is merely a commercial transaction. But about four and a half millions represent pension and furlough payments to members of the Indian services. Such payments are necessary to secure for India the administration we wish to give it, but still, if we follow Mr. Morley's advice—"Get into their skins, try to realise their feelings"—it is not hard to understand that the average native of India, who has no particular love for British Officials, though he also may not hate them, is annoyed at the idea that he has not only to pay for these gentlemen's services in India, but also to support them when they are on leave and in retirement. The true answer to any charge that India is being bled is, of course, to point to the enormous increase of revenue under our administration (from twenty-eight crores in 1843 to no less than 246 in 1903), to the indisputable improvements in sanitation, roads, railways, posts, and irrigation, and to the vast sums expended in famine relief.

I have already alluded in a previous letter to the question of taxes on cotton. Another instance of the curious differences which in our complicated empire may arise between the Governments of India and of other British possessions is afforded by the desire of the Canadians and others to exclude Indians from their territory. This exclusion no doubt wounds the vigilant and touchy Hindu mind, always sensitive to the idea that it is slighted or not appreciated. It is felt that Indian troops have rendered substantial services to England abroad ever since 1877, when Lord Beaconsfield influenced the proceedings of the Congress of Berlin by sending a detachment of them to Malta. They accompanied our officers to Penjdeh in 1885, and fought with us in the South African war, and at the relief of Peking. Also, India supplies labour to a vast number of British Colonies, such as Ceylon, Mauritius, and the West Indies, which would be economically lost without her assistance. Yet when in pursuit of their own perfectly legitimate objects Indians happen to go to a Colony where the interests of the inhabitants do not particularly require them





their claim to be allowed to settle like other British subjects is not allowed. Only their use is recognised; their rights are ignored. This, no doubt, is a serious grievance, of which more is likely to be heard, for it is adapted to popular argument. Nor do I see what logical reply can be given to Indian complaints. But though I think that the attitude of the Canadians is wrong, I doubt if any statesman would be justified in forcing a country to accept immigrants to whom the mass of the population are hostile. Great cities, especially seaports, seem able to be cosmopolitan, and to house half a dozen races with no worse result than occasional riots; but the juxtaposition of races of different languages and religions in an agricultural area has almost invariably proved a source of trouble, and has been the bane of Eastern Europe and Western Asia, as is attested by the perennial conflicts between the Russian peasantry and Jews, between Kurds and Armenians, and the turbulent jumble of Macedonia.

There are a number of other circumstances which though they are not grievances have contributed to cause the present unrest. Chief among them no doubt is the type of education which starts by treating the native as if he were going to turn miraculously into a European and then leaves him no more a European than before. Some public events also conspired to upset the national mind. Perhaps the fifty years' anniversary of the Mutiny had some disquieting influence, as also the recent resignation of Lord Curzon and Sir Bamfylde Fuller. The British public does not care much for the details of such incidents, and echoes the official view that discipline must be preserved and the superior authority supported at any cost. But in India jealous observers of British politics draw such conclusions as that either the Viceroy or the Home Government must be in the wrong, that perhaps both are wrong, and that at any rate divided councils or stupidity prevail somewhere.

But of such political influences on the temper of India the most important is the victory of Japan over Russia, which roughly coincided with the beginning of the Swadeshi movement. Not that it is an evil or a danger, for the rejuvenescence of Asia will be more beneficial to the human race than the stifling assertion of European rule and customs. But undoubtedly the Hindus, like many other Asiatic peoples, now feel that it is possible for Asiatics successfully to resist Europeans, and they also feel that their own institutions are not necessarily inferior. The agitators of Bengal demand the same rights as Europeans, but show less disposition than formerly to abandon their own customs.



### X—A QUESTION OF GRIEVANCES.

We have glanced at the real or fancied grievances of the people of India and at the incidental circumstances which have contributed towards the present unrest, but there remains one disquieting phenomenon which lies at the root of many of the others—namely, the isolation of Europeans in India and the gulf which separates them from all classes of natives. If not actually widening at present, this gulf has certainly widened in the last twenty-five years, and Anglo-Indians of all shades of opinion admit that this symptom is more serious than many others which appear more sensational and more immediately alarming.

The position of the English in India is singular, and has no adequate parallel in other countries. We do not hold it as a conquest; considered as an army of occupation our military force is ridiculously small. Nor do we hold it as a colony; the number of our colonists is still smaller. Are we then there with the consent and goodwill of the population, as a sort of aristocracy, not entirely loved, but felt to be necessary for the dignity and prosperity of the country? To a certain extent, perhaps, that is our position, and in some ways Anglo-Indians have an absentee landlord's desire to get away from his estates to more congenial scenes, but, unlike many absentee landlords, they are most conscientious. It is not the sense of duty that is wanting, but interest and affection.

In what lies the secret of British talent and superiority in colonial matters? The number and prosperity of our foreign possessions attest its existence, though those who have practical experience of the muddle of colonial government may often feel sceptical. It is not merely that we started before other people and found a vacant field. Many of our acquisitions were not obtained by right of first arrival and conquest. We have inherited (the word is perhaps euphemistic) from Dutch, Portuguese, and French, and it would seem that such accessions of territory were due not so much to local superiority as to our command of the sea and position in European politics. We are in moderation honest, but much less so than we think. Knowledge of our possessions and insight into the minds of their inhabitants are not our



strong points. We are, for instance, much worse informed than the Germans, and I could mention many cases—such as the troubles in Samoa in 1899 and the Uganda mutiny—which originated simply in the fact that our officials did not understand what the natives wanted. But in most parts of the world Englishmen show two excellent qualities. While remaining extremely British, they have a remarkable power of acquiring a second domicile, not merely in the Colonies, but in such countries as China and Turkey, and though they may talk a great deal about home, they are not like the Frenchman, who is always dreaming of Paris, and they are seldom happy for long when they have to return to England. And, secondly, our government has the great merit of rarely irritating native populations or meddling with their customs. It is easy-going and happy-go-lucky in its methods, but not interfering or inquisitorial; and though individual Englishmen are often violent and unjust in their dealings with other races, the general administration is usually just and impartial. Just and impartial the India Government certainly is, but in other respects the good qualities mentioned above are less conspicuous in India than in our other possessions. Though our rule is not really meddlesome or vexatious, yet it has become far more than in any other part of the Empire a vast official machine—a thing of codes, regulations, census, and statistics; and though Anglo-Indians are, as a class, easily distinguishable from stay-at-home Englishmen, yet neither the official, military, nor trading classes show much inclination to make India their home. It is, no doubt, not a good country for European colonisation, and perhaps no part of it is suited for rearing European children; but it has large tracts, particularly in the hills, where, if the inclination were present, Europeans might reside for much longer periods than are now usual. But journeys grow shorter and easier every year; we become more and more birds of passage; and I am told that the most recent military regulations about leave tend to strengthen the natural feeling of officers that their connexion with India is only casual.


But the isolation of the English in India need not be set down as altogether their own fault. They have done little to prevent it; but it is the result of Indian institutions quite as much as of British aloofness and rigidity. Hindu society is divided into castes—that is to say, groups—which may not marry or eat with one another, and are otherwise debarred from mixing. The English, through no action of their own, at once became regarded as a caste of the most exclusive sort—little better than Parias, so far as their total neglect of ceremonial purity was concerned, but obviously too powerful to be despised. It is difficult for a European with the best will in the world to become really intimate with a Hindu. Those who have travelled in Moslim countries such as Asia Minor must often have had the experience of being entertained by some village magnate who may have detested Christians and Europeans. But for all that he gives his guests board and lodging; he eats with them, and though they see nothing of his wife and family, they are



treated much as Mohammedans would be treated. But a similar traveller in India may know a Hindu who has been educated at an English University and speaks English like himself. Every courtesy and attention that can facilitate sightseeing or interviews with interesting personages he will receive. But he is not likely to be given a meal of any kind in his friend's house, and if in some out-of-the-way place there is no *dāk bungalow*, the Hindu, who has passed a great part of his life in endeavouring to acquire European manners and customs, will generally arrange that his European friend shall be put up by some native Christian or Armenian. The feeling underlying these actions is not different in kind, though less gross in expression, from that which makes a choleric colonel call a Bengali much better educated than himself a nigger. Nor is this feeling confined to the military class. I have noticed in a recent missionary publication the statement that most Europeans would be unwilling to receive the Holy Communion from the hands of a native priest.

But apart from these special difficulties it is hard for Asiatics to mingle socially with Europeans, because their tastes and ideas in all that concerns social life are radically different. The Asiatic divides his life into two parts, one public, which he regulates by ceremonial, the other private, in which he expects to take his ease. In the former he endures a weight of costume and a cumbrous intricacy of etiquette which to us seem intolerable, and will stuff himself at prolonged banquets with an almost religious zeal. But when his social duties are over, he discards his costumes and salutations and associates only with the members of his family or with intimate friends. From Constantinople to Peking there is not an Asiatic who will willingly put on evening dress after the day's work and attend a formal dinner or any kind of evening party. This seems to him a thing which he might do occasionally at the command of a king, but as a daily routine he thinks it an uncomfortable form of insanity. European existence, ignoring as it does the distinction between private and ceremonial life, offends him in every aspect. In one way it seems wanting in decency and dignity; in another it is stiff and irksome just when he wants to be free and easy. The difference between European and Asiatic social life is largely due to the part played by women in the former, and I would suggest as a paradox—paradox being merely a name for truths which cannot be put into practice in this imperfect world—that instead of worrying about the education of Indian women, as philanthropists are wont to do, the best way to devise some social life in which Europeans and Hindus would see more of one another would be to prohibit European women from going to India.

Still the gulf between English and Indians remains curious, for we have a power of getting on with strange races. I have often noticed in East Africa how Englishmen, who seemed the reverse of cosmopolitan and adaptable, were able in dealing with natives to show thorough insight and sympathy, and pass hours in their very dull company without any signs of weariness. The fact is, I fear, that the Englishman loves to condescend, and does not much like to meet a man of another colour—a Chinaman or a Hindu—as an equal. Hence in India the relation in which





we are most successful is that between officers and men in native regiments. We can give the kind of distant friendship which this position requires, though even here one hears of natives complaining that they do not always receive the marks of regard which they conceive due to their dignity. But in other classes the difficulty about friendship seems to be that there is no common ground, no real desire for simple friendly association. The European has generally a suspicion that a native who seeks F's society wants to get something out of him, and the feeling is probably in most cases not unjust. Among his own people, the Hindu is accustomed to associate chiefly with his relatives. If he goes beyond the limits of his family it is for a definite purpose, and in his intercourse with other classes of Indians he is almost as distant as he is with Europeans.

Of late years all classes of Indians have begun to show a remarkable skill and interest in athletic games, such as cricket and tennis, and this, it may be hoped, will promote greater intimacy, but, setting aside soldiers and Europeans engaged in educational work, whose interest in natives is somewhat professional, I have not often noticed the two races playing together. Anglo-Indian Clubs frequently contain a few Indian members, but in my experience (which I admit is small) I have only seen in them two Parsees and one Mohammedan nobleman. It is in the Club that the social life of Anglo-Indians centres, particularly up-country, and it is an intensely, almost aggressively European life, divorced in thought and interest from Indian affairs—which are considered as shop, as business to be scrupulously performed, but put aside when the time for recreation comes—and finding its pleasure largely in talking of furlough in prospect and in importing as many English recreations as possible to beguile the hours of exile.

Though a knowledge of English is spreading widely among Hindus, yet it is to most of them not a second language which they pick up naturally because there are so many English in India, but an accomplishment learned painfully at school. Last summer I was shown round a city of northern India by a Brahman and his son. Both spoke English fluently and accurately, but it was a literary dialect such as no native of these islands would ever employ. The father's diction was the more natural: he had talked a good deal with Englishmen in his youth, he said. The son spoke like an Essay of Macaulay. He had attended a missionary school for the purpose of learning the language (which shows how liberal Brahman can be in some respects), but had had few opportunities of speaking to Europeans. Yet there was a British regiment stationed in that town. But they kept to their own quarter, and no Hindus frequented it except tradesmen, who communicated with them in a special jargon.

I knew India first in 1884, and there can, I think, be no doubt that since that time the European official class has become more isolated. Twenty years ago or so people made up their minds that they had to spend their lives in India; they were often left for long periods in stations where they had no one but Indians for company;



when their service was over they not infrequently settled in the country; they sometimes married Indian women. Nowadays there is hardly any intermarriage. The few cases that occur are almost exclusively marriages of Englishwomen to Indians performed in England. The hybrids commonly known as Eurasians seem wanting in vigour, and by no means successful as a breed, so that the cessation of these unions is in one way not to be regretted; but, for all that, it is a remarkable sign of isolation.

Nor has the recent Imperialist movement tended to lessen this isolation, but rather to increase it. The Imperialist thinks of "our dependencies," of the white man's burden, of the glories of the island race. He puts himself and his countrymen in the place of an emperor, and in imagination shares the crown. But that is exactly the type of sentiment which is not wanted in India. What is wanted is the much rarer aspiration that all civilised citizens of the British Empire, whatever their colour, language, or creed, should associate as equals, and also that Europeans should be willing to learn from Asiatics.



## XI.—THE MIND OF THE PEOPLE.

In connexion with the isolation of the British in India one cannot help noticing that in the last twenty years the interest in oriental studies has decreased. Fewer books appear on these subjects, and no one combines the popular and scientific treatment of them as did the late Professor Max Müller, himself not an Englishman by birth. Whenever I go to the Indian Institute at Oxford it seems to me a howling wilderness, a desert where reverberates the voice of some professor imparting the elements of Tamil or Telugu to a scanty audience of students, but the number of visitors who frequent the library and museum is very small. Now I venture to think that this want of interest in oriental studies in a nation which has an enormous oriental Empire is a serious deficiency. I do not mean to say that a knowledge of the classical languages of India, or of its history and antiquities, is necessary to produce a good administrator. Many excellent administrators know nothing of them, and many scholars make very poor public servants. Also, I would emphasise the fact that it is by no means necessary that oriental studies should be connected exclusively with dead or archaic languages. There is a large vernacular literature in India which is strangely neglected even by scholars. Yet it is worthy of attention in itself and of the highest value and importance for understanding the mind of the people. Clearly it is the interest as well as the duty of an imperial nation that it should be thoroughly familiar with the customs and thoughts of the races which it governs, and in India this knowledge, if not dependent on Sanskrit and Arabic scholarship, is at least closely connected with the study of Indian languages and religions. The value of such pursuits to the Government is not to be measured by the literary output, but by the qualities they tend to develop, particularly if, like all true studies, they are lifelong. Those who have such interests will by their own inclinations be led to learn more of native languages than examinations require, and to gain a sympathetic understanding of Indian life and thought. I am convinced that, whether Europeans have to deal with highly civilised Asiatics, such as Hindus and Chinese, or with wild Africans, the best key to



their regard and affection is a proper knowledge of their language. This remark is so obvious that it would be quite unnecessary were it not that a contrary and dangerous doctrine is constantly preached—namely, that it is a waste of time to learn more of a language than is necessary to make oneself understood, which generally means an ungrammatical jargon consisting chiefly of malformed imperatives. But I am sure that even savages, and still more civilised Asiatics, appreciate the compliment and friendly interest implied in an attempt to learn their language thoroughly, and if to a knowledge of the language can be added an acquaintance with the literature which they respect, then the effect is proportionally greater. There are at present among the members of the Indian Civil Service eminent scholars and students, but they are not very many in number, and they are chiefly to be found in special departments, devoted to education or science. If I can judge from a fairly wide experience as a traveller—and on such a point it is permissible to judge from general impressions, for it is the average that is important, not the exceptions—the ordinary executive officer does not take much interest in the ways and manner of life of the people round about him. He regards them from a purely official point of view, as the business which it is his duty to attend to, and in this respect military officers are perhaps better than civilians, for, though their objects are by no means scientific, they do make an attempt to understand the tempers and customs of their men.

I have been told that in Allahabad, on the last anniversary of the Mutiny (May 10, 1907), a rising of the native population was apprehended, and that careful plans were made for securing the safety of the European population in such an event. The calm and prudence with which the necessary steps were taken deserve all praise, but the most remarkable feature of the story, as I heard it, is that no one seems to have known whether there was really any danger or not, so great was the gulf between the European and Indian population. Native servants spread the alarm, and Europeans had no means of ascertaining whether their tales were true. It was not a critical situation where a trifle might have turned an excitable crowd this way or that. It appears that the natives had no evil intentions, and as a matter of fact nothing happened. But so isolated was the position of Europeans that they had to prepare for the worst: when the possibility of danger was hinted at they could meet it adequately, but they could not take the simpler step of satisfying themselves that there was no danger, because they were out of touch with the Indian population. Now, I venture to say that this uncertainty could hardly have existed had there been a reasonable number of Europeans having, in addition to their official work, interests which brought them into continual contact with natives.


It is easy to suggest remedies for the neglect of oriental studies. The Asiatic Society and other bodies are continually drumming into the ears of the Government the necessity of providing more and better-organised teaching, and they cannot drum too loudly and persistently, for with our enormous oriental Empire





we ought to do in this branch of education not merely as much as France and Germany, but a great deal more. But the root of the evil seems to be not so much the want of teaching as the want of students. The result of filling most minor posts with natives is that comparatively few young Englishmen look forward to an Indian career, and no large body of students is necessary to recruit the 1,200 Civil Servants who constitute our European establishment in India. Outside the ranks of those professionally connected with India, it is to be feared that the interest in oriental literature is small. Some thirty or forty years ago it was surprisingly active; India seemed to promise a key to the sciences of philosophy and religion. But there is a fashion in these things, and the taste of the intellectual public now turns to quite different subjects. But though the Rig Veda is not so momentous for the history of humanity as Max Müller supposed, the practical importance of Eastern literature and thought remains. Into their merits I will not here enter; I only wish to insist on the fact that we have undertaken to manage India, and that therefore we must—not necessarily as a moral duty, but as a condition of carrying on the business—try to understand India. In his Budget speech Mr. Morley quoted General Gordon's words: "To government there is but one way, and it is eternal truth. Get into their skins; try to realise their feelings. That is the true secret of government." Now, it is true of all nations, but specially of Indians, that they are swayed by ideas, and one of the easiest ways of entering into their ideas is by their literature. It is a way which we cannot afford to neglect, and it is wonderful how great and rapid is the success of attempts to sympathise with the thoughts of the Hindu—not to convert or reform him, but to understand and make the best of his ideals. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that one of the strongest movements in Hindu religion at the present day is the so-called theosophical school, due largely to the genius and energy of Mrs. Besant. Now we do not expect Collectors to have Mrs. Besant's eloquence or wish them to become Yogis, but surely the success of this attempt to treat Indian religion sympathetically suggests that an intelligently sympathetic insight might have a like success in other spheres. But here we feel that we come back to the old difficulty: the rarity of first-hand study of the people, of affectionate interest, of receptivity, of the desire to learn.

One great evil of the Indian bureaucracy is no doubt its inordinate love of writing, often complained of and never really corrected. A Collector when interviewed in his office is generally found seated behind a literal rampart of papers which fortify his writing-table with battlements and bastions of manuscript, so that one has to parley with him through a hole between piles of documents, a breach in his defensive works, so to speak. But these mountains of papers are not really a defence and strength. As the Sudd-weed chokes and strangles the Nile, so does this awful papyrus growth bind and hamper the energies of the Civil Servant. More than once I have heard a Collector say, "I have only been six months at this station, and have not had time to get out of the



Office," and more than once I have found that the advice of Collectors as to highways and routes in their provinces was not based upon knowledge. I have known them state that a place was inaccessible except on foot, when it was really reached by an excellent carriage road, but they had simply never had time to think of going there.

The department of government with which I am best acquainted—the Foreign Office—is not generally supposed to be parsimonious in the use of ink and paper, but, judging some files of Indian correspondence which I have seen by its standard, I should say that the Indian Government write about four times as much as they need. This is to some extent the fault of the continual call for information and statistics which comes from Parliament and the Home authorities, and when some Member of Parliament shows an over-eager thirst for information about India, Mr. Morley would have all my sympathy if he replied that he didn't know the answer to the question and did not mean to ask. But it is not merely the inquisitiveness of Westminster or Whitehall which provokes the mass of writing. There is an old story of an Indian Governor who was shown a long file of correspondence which had taken place between two officials who occupied rooms in the same building. What, he exclaimed, aren't they within braying distance of one another? The Indian bureaucrat has an ingrained tendency to record in due official form every circumstance, however trivial. I am myself the possessor of an invitation to lunch (a demi-official lunch, no doubt) marked "No. 8, Miscellaneous General," a most suitable heading for correspondence with tourists. The serious evil of all this writing is that the most practical intelligences gradually succumb without knowing it to the conviction that the due despatch of official correspondence is the foundation and essence of their work. I am not forgetting that executive officials are on tour for a certain part of the year; but even then they have their travelling office and arrange their impressions under the proper headings. The evil inherent in this system is peculiarly insidious, for it waxes when things are going smoothly and the administration is efficient. Hitches and difficulties require personal examination, but when all is well a moderately highly placed official collects reports from his subordinates, recasts or comments on them, and transmits them to his superiors. There is a great danger in such circumstances of the whole business of government becoming a mere machine, smooth and almost unerring in its movements, but mechanical and unadaptable. Just at the time when the works are giving perfect satisfaction, the whole engine may break down with a crash, not because the mechanism was unsatisfactory, but because no attention was paid to the ground over which it was travelling.




## XII.—THE MIXTURE OF ELEMENTS.

Useless as forecasts of the future are, one cannot resist the temptation of speculating what is likely to result from the unique commixture of European and Asiatic elements which is seething and fuming in India, or at least from analysing the forces at work, the granite-like blocks of immemorial custom and tradition and the powerful solvents poured upon them. Is the hissing and fizzling merely superficial, or are we, like Hannibal, bursting the rocks with vinegar? Is the East really unchanging? One generation of writers assumes it as an axiom, and the next begins every discussion by saying it is a commonplace that the East changes like everything else.

India has, indeed, a better claim to the epithet of unchanging than Turkey, to which it is generally applied, for when one gets down to the bed-rock of village life, one seems to be dealing with a state of things which probably existed two thousand years ago, or perhaps earlier. Hindu social and political institutions show surprisingly little power of growth, but they remain and seem to confute the oft-repeated dictum of their own philosophy that all things change and decay. The obvious changes which have taken place are mainly the result of the series of invasions from the North-West, and subsequently by sea, to which the country has been exposed since the dawn of history. And yet how little they have really effected! All the invasions of the Greeks, Persians, and so-called Scythians have left little record behind them except a school of art, which, though betraying its exotic origin, has become intensely Indian. The strongest influence which ever assailed Indian institutions is Mohammedanism, and, comparatively speaking, the result is small—sixty millions, including the descendants of Moslem invaders, out of three hundred millions, or one-fifth of the population. Yet for three centuries the professors of this most belligerent and proselytising faith continually invaded India, and for another two or more they held it as conquerors. Contrast Persia and Central Asia, where the old religions collapsed at once before the victorious Arabs, so that it is difficult nowadays to find a few timid adherents of the old faiths.

The great stability of Hindu institutions depends to some extent on another national feature. It has often been remarked



that the Hindus have written no history, the fact being that they have done very little to write about. Their intelligences have by no means been sterile; they have given the world some good poetry and some good architecture, any amount of philosophy and religious speculation, and copious treatises on the sciences congenial to them, such as grammar, mathematics, and astrology. Indian philosophy and speculation changed and developed, but political institutions remained unchanged, because no one took sufficient interest in them to call in question the fundamental principles handed down by tradition. Until the establishment of British rule, and perhaps later, a Raja remained a person who killed his relations, married many wives, amassed treasure, and managed his dominions as if they were his private estate. On the other hand the Raja did not succeed in becoming the representative and director of the nation to the same degree as the Emperors of China and Japan. His authority in matters of morals, religion, and even law was very small, all these being the prerogative of the intellectual aristocracy or Brahmins. In Indian history we find few instances of movements of nobles against kings or of the common people against the nobles, but we do find in the early period traces of a struggle between the royal or warrior caste and the Brahmins. The latter conquered, and their persistent and active existence through the centuries as a dominant class, which was neither a nobility nor a priesthood in the ordinary sense of the words, is one of the most remarkable phenomena in the social history of the world, and goes far to explain the extraordinary character of Hindu civilisation, because the strongest and most persistent force was not, as in other countries, either political or military.

The future of India suggests a series of perplexing riddles. In politics, cloudy though the outlook may be, it is perhaps easier to see the way than in religious, moral, and social questions. Indian political problems will, of course, continue to give the British Government great and incessant anxiety: they will demand infinite tact and sympathetic knowledge, if occasional outbreaks are to be prevented. But it seems to me that the course of political development must take the form of maintaining an autocratic government, but at the same time increasing the numbers and functions of advisory councils, and, though it would be inexpedient to make any of these councils more than advisory, it must be remembered that the right of giving public advice is a very important privilege, and that the Government of India, which might have to justify itself before Parliament, could reject the advice offered by its Indian Councils only from the strongest and most explicable reasons. Our Parliamentary institutions do not flourish in Asiatic countries, not so much from a lack of oratorical power or interest in debate as from an incapacity to transact business through the medium of a large Council; but it would seem that the various assemblies which have been convoked and had longer or shorter lives in such different countries as Turkey, Persia, and Japan have all been able to state clearly what they wanted and why.





It is on these lines that have been framed the proposals for modifying the present system of Indian administration which are now under discussion. They were, it would appear, elaborated by the Indian Government as early as March last—that is, before the riots in Lahore and Rawal Pindi—so that they are not concessions made in a panic or extorted by violence. But also it has been very properly decided that these ebullitions ought not to deprive the people of India of beneficial measures which would otherwise have been passed in the natural course of things. The proposals were submitted to the Home Government, received its approval, and in August last were communicated by the Government of the Viceroy to the various local Governments of India in a circular letter, which was simultaneously made public. It requested that “these provisional and tentative proposals” might “receive the careful scrutiny and sympathetic consideration that their high importance demands, and that a reply might be sent to the Government of India by next March, after consultation” with important bodies and individuals representative of the various classes of the community. The desire expressed in this correspondence to act in harmony with the best opinions, both official and private, that can be obtained is noticeable, as is also the publicity of the request for advice. India is taken into the confidence of its Government, which has hitherto been disposed to stand somewhat aloof, and to mark its most ordinary transactions with the official label *secret*. The gist of the proposals is that an Imperial Advisory Council of fifty-three members shall be established for the Central Government of India, to be composed of selected ruling chiefs and other prominent persons. It is not, it would appear, to meet regularly, but it will be consulted from time to time by letter or by special meetings. Similar Provincial Advisory Councils, composed of provincial notables, are proposed for the several provinces. The members of all these various Councils are to be nominated, but there is to be a substantial enlargement on an elective basis of the Legislative Councils, both of the Viceroy and of provincial Governors. Also greater facilities for interpellation and debate are to be given at the meetings of the various Councils. If one must make an unfavourable criticism on these proposals, it is that they sound very complicated; all official arrangements, and especially official nomenclature, in India seems to have this vice. It is difficult to write correctly about all these supreme and provincial Governments, these executive, advisory, and legislative Councils, without seeming to use the language of the circumlocution office. But the main idea which animates this elaborate scheme seems perfectly sound, for it is merely the old Asiatic form of government, which has satisfied everybody for thousands of years. “The King called a Council of notables and consulted them about the affairs of his kingdom” has been the method of government in India under Hindu and Mohammedan rulers alike, and there is no reason why it should not flourish equally under Edward VII. Neither Hindu nor Moslem kings felt that their position was compromised by following advice; nor were the notables dissatisfied, because their duty was merely to advise, not to decide.



It is not to be expected, however, that these proposed changes will be hailed with enthusiasm in India. The power of expression there lies mainly with extremists, whose gift of language vastly exceeds their importance as representatives of Indian feeling. They have been agitating, and will continue to agitate, for some approximation to Parliamentary Government, for the election of Councils which shall decide as well as advise, and the appointment of Ministers responsible to the people. It is not fanciful, I think, to foresee a day, distant perhaps, but not a dream, when Indians will have a far greater share in the government than they have now, when half the members who sit in the Council of the Viceroy or the India Office will be Indians; but I do not anticipate much progress in the other direction—that of parliamentary government. The idea is wholly exotic in India. It receives the eloquent approval of a portion of the educated classes because they think it is the great political discovery and palladium of Europe, and that not to possess it, or at least not to strive for it, is an admission of backwardness and inferiority. These classes are profoundly influenced by European public opinion, but it often penetrates to them through literature, and hence slowly, so that the ideas prevalent in India may be already out of fashion here. It may be doubted if the wave of Imperial sentiment which has recently overspread Great Britain is favourable to enthusiasm for parliamentary institutions, and in particular for party government. These things are maintained and even respected, because there is no alternative at hand, but were there any practical proposal to make the government more continuous and authoritative by some such device as strengthening the Privy Council, or making some of the Ministries permanent, it would probably have the support of large portions of the educated classes, and this lukewarmness for democratic institutions, the feeling that it is at any rate unnecessary to introduce them when they do not exist, will probably pass on to India.

I have said that for the prophet, not for the politician, the purely political problem is the simplest of India's riddles, but it is really artificial to treat it apart from the perplexing problems—social, educational, and religious—which touch it on all sides; and, to be accurate, condition it, for a reformed, christianised, and educated India would be a different country, which would require a different government, and might object even to a Viceroy.

One of the most remarkable changes in these general political-social conditions of India is the growth of an Indian feeling—that is, of a feeling of Indian nationality. Now, the value of a word like "Indian" or "European" depends entirely on association and contrast. In an English village, for instance, the quality of being a European has no value; it is not more important than the quality of being a mammal. But in an African up-country station the all-important point about a human being is whether he is a European or not. Similarly in India itself the idea and word "Indian" hardly existed in pre-European times. It was, like China, a country cut off from the rest of the world and disdainfully indifferent to the existence of external barbarians. Within were dis-



tion and oppositions without number: Hindus and Mohammedans; Brahmans, Rajputs, and Sudras; a hundred languages, a thousand sects. But no external fact was sufficiently important to call forth by contrast a feeling of internal union. This has been supplied by the presence of Europeans. Great as may be the differences and even the hatred between Hindus and Mohammedans, it is felt by all that the division is European on the one side and Hindus and Mohammedans on the other (as, to quote an alluded example, was shown in the Mutiny), and not European and Mohammedans versus Hindus. And that, in spite of the onerous of the Mutiny, is certainly a good thing; the European is impartial.



### XIII.—INDIA AND THE INDIAN.

There is, as I have pointed out, a growing feeling among Hindus and Mohammedans alike that the words "India" and "Indian" stand for something, that the various inhabitants of the country have some common interests and form part of a common whole. But it would be a great mistake to conclude that the process of unification is rapid, that old distinctions are already lost, and that a new, generalised form of society, free from ancient limitations and regulations, has arisen. If that is happening it is happening slowly, and the conservative and reactionary forces are strong. The mere consciousness of India and Indian institutions as a reality disposes Hindus to respect those institutions, and the spirit of progress which would reform them has to contend with the patriotism which defends them.

The general tendency of the influences at work in India is naturally to weaken caste and prevent its strict observance. The institutions which bring human beings together, such as railways, hospitals, schools, and gaols, affect one class of society or another, and force the strictest formalist to commit infringements of caste which would have been regarded as unpardonable fifty years ago. But for all that, caste—that is to say, the system which divides society into mutually exclusive sections able to associate with one another only to a limited extent—does not appear to be on the verge of extinction, but has merely had to modernise its rules. The permanence of caste is due mainly to the fact that it is a social system which has grown up among the people, and not, as some of its aspects suggest, a religious code imposed from without. The absence of a hierarchy and discipline in Hindu religious observances is very remarkable. Though the Brahmins have probably written more books and made more rules for the proper conduct of life than any other religious body, yet they have nothing corresponding to a Pope or even a bishop. They do not form a tribunal to decide what is a breach of caste in theory or whether a particular act constitutes such a breach. It is the business of the Panchayet or Caste Council to decide that, and, if guilt is proved, to fix and inflict the penalty. This Council is composed of the most respectable members of the caste. They are not likely to be men





of exceptional intellect or wide views, but, on the other hand, as they are legislating for themselves as well as for the accused before them, they are not likely to be carried away by fanaticism, and make unpractical rules. But they are actuated by the most parochial and conservative notions of respectability and dignity, and in matters concerning marriage are likely to represent the views of their wives, who have, naturally, narrower and more conservative ideas than the male sex. Hence the unfortunate Hindu who is expelled from his caste cannot pose as the victim of ecclesiastical tyranny or find men of the world ready to think that these priestly regulations do not really much matter. He is a man who is excommunicated and ejected by his neighbours because he will not live in an ordinary, respectable way. He has no public to appeal to, for according to Hindu ideas he cannot dream of belonging to another caste, and the only section of society to which he can belong is precisely the one which will have nothing to do with him. If, as sometimes happens, the sentence of excommunication is pronounced against a number of families who have deliberately or by accident broken some caste regulation, then they can form a new caste of their own. But the fate of an isolated individual who comes into conflict with the caste is woful, and the trouble extends to his family. For they can only marry within the caste, and that is now forbidden; so, if he has unmarried sons and daughters, he is likely to remain with them unmarried, one of the greatest misfortunes and disgraces which a Hindu can conceive. This system clearly gives an enormous power to old-fashioned, conventional ideas of respectability. The result in practice is that caste rules which interfere with the general comfort and convenience are modified or found to admit of easy expiation, which generally includes a public dinner given by the offender to the caste. But regulations which do not conflict with the comfort of the average respectable Hindu, though they may be irksome to progressive minds, and in particular rules which affect the status and dignity of the whole caste, such as those concerning marriage, are reaffirmed rather than relaxed. For instance, the rule that a Hindu must not cross the sea, or if he does must submit to most disagreeable and costly ceremonies of purification, has been found susceptible of considerable modification, and the purification has been reduced to a simple rite, not much more inconvenient than such incidents of travelling as quarantine and medical inspections. In difficult cases, where the interests of all are identical, Hindus can take unexpectedly common-sense views. When waterworks were first established consternation prevailed, for clearly everybody drawing water from common pipes and taps, and not, as before, from wells reserved for the use of a particular caste, was liable to be contaminated. But various ways were found out of the difficulty. When the water in question was drawn from the Ganges or other holy streams it was agreed to leave the decision to the river itself. If it declined to flow into the unhallowed pipes, clearly the whole scheme would collapse. If it showed no repugnance for them, why should mankind be more scrupulous than a deity? Where the



sanctity of the water used was not sufficient to justify such confidence, recourse was had to another argument. Impurity thus casually contracted might admittedly be removed by payment of a fine, and the water-rate might be regarded as a recurring ceremony of expiation. Again, though food is exquisitely sensitive to pollution, it has always been admitted that fruit, the natural uncooked product of the tree, did not fall within the same prohibitions, and for the convenience of railway travellers and those who visit Europeans confectionery, cakes, lemonade, and light refreshments in general have been assimilated to fruit, and may be enjoyed with a good conscience, though to partake of rice and water in similar circumstances would entail loss of caste. In schools under English management a Brahman cook is kept (who, being of the highest caste, can pollute nobody), and the refectory is divided into partitions by screens, so that the students theoretically eat in different rooms. When they play football they make acquaintance with each other's boots in the course of the game (this form of contact with leather not having been foreseen by the sages of yore), but they shrink in horror from the pollution of touching a fellow-student's boots when once he has taken them off. But when it is a question of inter-marriage, there is not the same disposition to invent these pleasant excuses and compromises. The most that can be said is that at the present day there is a certain disposition to facilitate marriages between sub-castes; to allow, so to speak, the families of barristers and solicitors to intermarry, though public opinion is not yet ripe for an alliance of either with the family of a banker or doctor. The general opinion in India seems to be that the abolition of caste would not be an unmixed blessing. Its cramping, unprogressive aspect, is of course, obvious, but at a time when so many ancient laws and usages seem to be undermined and tottering, and nothing solid has been constructed to take their place, the country can ill afford to lose an institution which, like the Indian village, is a national expression of collective life as much as representative government and municipalities are in Europe. Hindu castes are so various in their origin and nature that it is difficult to generalise about the good or evil effects of the institution as a whole; but some of them at any rate are corporations which afford to their members mutual assistance and protection, which they would not easily find elsewhere. A philosophic Hindu would perhaps demur to the proposition that morality derives its sanction from caste, but there can be little doubt that for the ordinary man the usage of his caste is the standard of honour and respectable conduct. In a country where patriotism and civic feeling are weak, where military and feudal honour are unknown conceptions in large tracts, where religion assumes extravagant and non-moral forms, any sudden abolition of this standard might be very dangerous.

We have seen how the tenacity and resistance of caste prejudices is strongest in questions of inter-marriage, and the same reasons no doubt explain the difficulty of effecting any reform by the thorny questions which concern the position and education of



women, such as early marriage and the re-marriage of widows, which occupy the attention not only of missionaries and philanthropists but of all serious Hindus. When we say that the forces of conservatism and of prejudice are on the side of the existing Hindu customs in such matters, we must remember that feminine influence is chief among these forces, and that women are at least as much responsible as men for maintaining the present social order. One is often assured in India by English ladies who know something of Hindu domestic life that the men would gladly see their wives emerge at least partially from the seclusion of the purdah, but that the women are reluctant from timidity, and still more from a feeling that by showing themselves they lose dignity. Similarly, it would seem to be the women who hurry on child marriages. One's first inference is to think that in these intimate matters people must be the best judges of what suits their nation best, but this does not seem to be universally true. The marriage customs of some savage peoples are undoubtedly deleterious, and, if that comparison is thought insulting to the Hindus, nobody (including Emperors of China, who have legislated in vain) has ever been able to understand why Chinese women deform their feet, or to stop them from doing it. No doubt Missionary writers have painted Zenana life in too lurid colours, and such a book as Miss Noble's most interesting work, "The Web of Indian Life," gives on the whole a juster view. It leaves on me the impression of erring on the side of excessive appreciation, but it is obvious that it is written with a knowledge of the facts of Zenana life in one part of India; and, making all allowances for the bias of the talented authoress, it would have been impossible for her to have written as she has if that life were, as some would have us believe, a dreary imprisonment, with intervals of torture. It is pretty clear that, however severe may be the discipline which Hindu women have to undergo in their youth, they enjoy in middle and old age an authority and respect greater than usually fall to woman's share in Europe. But, the point to which I would call attention is the tenacity of social usages. The stock instance is perhaps Keshub Chunder Sen, founder of the Brahmo Samaj of India, who, after making opposition to premature marriage part of his religious programme, married his own daughter while still a child to the Raja of Kuch Behar. There cannot be anything in the climate or general conditions of the country which necessitates these very early marriages, for among Parsees and Mohammedans, who are probably, on the whole, of better physique than Hindus, a more reasonable limit of age prevails by custom, and in Baroda, which is in many ways the most progressive State in India, such a limit is fixed by law. So that it would seem that the authority of an enlightened ruler is far more efficacious than a body of enlightened native public opinion.

A worse evil than child-marriage is the fate of widows, who are forbidden to remarry and who live under such restrictions that they are practically outcasts. It is said that there are twenty million widows in India, and among them are included not only those who would be widows in Europe but also unhappy little girls



who, while still children or literally infants, have lost their betrothed husbands and are hence almost born widows. But though the permission of remarriage to widows is a plank in the platform of most Hindu social reformers, the sentiments of the mass of the people seem to turn the other way, and even if a plebiscite were to be held about the practice of widow-burning I doubt if it would be condemned by a majority, except among the educated classes. I remember once talking to a Hindu of the lower classes—a watchman—on this subject. In the gentlest voice, as if he were pleading in the cause of humanity, he firmly expressed his opinion that Suttee ought to be permitted. He started from the premiss that a woman ought to remain invariably true to one man; that, he insisted, was an obvious postulate of religion, civilisation, and good feeling; nor would even his politeness allow him to hear it called in question. And, granting that postulate, it was, he considered, better and safer that the widow should burn herself. This may sound very masculine logic, but the extraordinary thing is that the women of India do not seem averse to Suttee, as might be supposed. In the year 1905 six cases were recorded as having happened—indicative, it may be presumed, of others which were not discovered—and in all of them it appeared that in spite of legal prohibitions and the absence of any public opinion requiring the sacrifice the woman had insisted on offering herself, and the men had been merely consenting, not compelling, parties.





#### XIV.—CUSTOMS AND PREJUDICES.

In previous articles I have pointed out how there remains in many departments of Hindu life a vast concretion of custom and prejudice which is affected only slightly and slowly by the new agencies which have been working in India during the last century. It is only natural that this tenacity and persistence should be seen most clearly in religion. The Hindus are essentially a religious people, and their varied and vigorous religious activity through the whole course of history contrasts with the poverty of their political and military achievements. Hindu religion has often been compared to a jungle, and it is still growing. If it does not for the moment promise to produce any fine trees, the persistent undergrowth is ubiquitous.

When one first sees Benares, the most sacred of Hindu cities, the two most conspicuous objects are the Dufferin Bridge and the Mosque of Aurungzeb, which dominates the ghats and the river. One might suppose it was some Mohammedan city, with an admixture of European civilisation, like Smyrna or Salonica. But the impression is deceptive. The bridge serves chiefly to carry an undiminishing crowd of pilgrims to the shrines of deities whose legends and attributes seem incompatible with engineering or any form of science, and the mosque of the fanatical Emperor, built as an insult to the Hindu religion on the site of the Golden Temple which he destroyed, is a proof that persecution can accomplish little against obstinacy and vitality. In vain it rears its lofty minarets; it is surrounded and isolated by the idolatrous shrines it was intended to overawe, and the British law, of which the Hindu can make skilful use, recognises the claims of various sects to holy trees and stones with an impartiality that produces an illogical but still orderly result. Mohammedans may not touch a certain tree because it is sacred, or enter by this gateway or use that courtyard, or make any demonstration of the power of Islam. Only a few of the faithful enter the mosque on Friday by a side-door and recite the midday prayer, lest by neglect they should lose their prescriptive right. But the Golden Temple has grown up again close to its old site. It is rather cramped and shut in by narrow lanes and crowded buildings, like a plant that has forced



its way up among stones; but there are the golden domes, and the Well of Knowledge, and monstrous deities grinning triumphantly as if there had never been such a thing as a Mohammedan Emperor. You may not enter the shrine—the Hindu delights to impose restrictions of this sort on Europeans—but from a shop opposite you may watch the unceasing stream of pilgrims—poor people who come on foot and rich people who leave their palanquins at the door—and see the piles of flowers carried in and periodically carried out again when the overloaded altars can no longer hold all the offerings. The old has grown up again round the new and almost strangled it. And one has much the same feeling as one rows down the stream and looks at the ghats. Sometimes a happy point of view offers a spacious prospect of terraced platforms and flights of steps leading up to aerial shrines, but the general impression is that of crowded buildings growing one on the top of the other, like shells and zoophytes on the rocks of a tropical shore. Nor do the ordinary accidents of decay have any importance in this world. Sindia's ghat has collapsed and fallen into the water. No one has made an attempt to repair it; that, indeed, is not surprising, but nobody seems even to have noticed that it has collapsed. The ablutions and offerings go on all the same, and people sit praying on the half-submerged stones as calmly as the occupants of private pews in a respectable English church.

In the three thousand years or so for which we have a record of the national religion of India it has certainly not remained unchanged, but it has persistently refused to grow in any other than its own way or to accept, except in the spirit of the freest eclecticism, the trammels of any foreign or even any indigenous system. The most extraordinary instance of this is afforded by the disappearance of Buddhism, which, after being the State religion of India, was, in the slow course of centuries, completely overgrown and overwhelmed. And, on a small scale, much the same process seems to be beginning with the Sikhs. Their Church was originally a variation of Hinduism, created at least partly under the influence of Mohammedanism, and sufficiently distinct and unorthodox to detach itself from the mass of Hindu sects. It subsequently also became a political corporation of armed men, and assumed so decided an individuality that many people are under the impression that Sikhs are a distinct race, though their characteristic look and dress are matters of comparatively recent custom, and they in no way differ physically from their neighbours. But now that they are no longer an independent political power, the difference between them and the surrounding Hindu population is said to be becoming gradually obliterated, and their religion, if nothing happens to revivify it, will probably in the course of time sink to the position of an ordinary Hindu sect.

The statistics of the spread of Christianity in India are interesting. There are nearly three million Christians in a population of nearly three hundred millions, and of this number about half a million are Europeans or Eurasians, leaving a total of about two and a half million natives of India—that is to say, a sect rather



more numerous than the Sikhs or Jains. It is true that the number of Christians has increased of late years, and between 1872 and 1901 nearly doubled, rising from one and a half million to nearly three. But, considering that Christianity is at least the nominal faith of the ruling race, the figures are very small. The importance of the increase is further diminished by the admission that native Christians are chiefly recruited from the lowest castes or from half-savage tribes and classes who stand altogether outside the Hindu system—in other words, from those who in no way represent the Hindu or Mohammedan world, and who have everything to gain and nothing to lose by joining any sort of religious community. Among the upper and middle classes the number of converts is small. Missionaries vainly argue that Christianity originally spread upwards from the lowest strata of society to the aristocracy, and will do so in India. The cases are by no means parallel, for primitive Christianity began as a religion of the poor and worked its way upwards, whereas in India it made its first appearance as the religion of the ruling race and yet has made no considerable body of converts except among outcasts. The religious statistics of Bengal (including Eastern Bengal), which must be considered the most educated and most Europeanised province, are striking. In a population of nearly fifty million Hindus and twenty-five million Mohammedans it would appear that there are rather more than a quarter of a million Christians. Of the Hindus thirty-five millions are worshippers of Durga, Kali, and other goddesses—a form of religion which does not hold a very high place in the esteem of intellectual Hindus, and is more than suspected in some of its branches of practising immoral rites. The remainder are chiefly Vaishnavas of the emotional sect founded by Chaitanya. Some sects seem to be due to a mixture of Mohammedan and Hindu ideas, such as the Kartabhajas and Panchpiriyas, but no similar amalgams with Christianity are recorded. In the North-West, however, the Kadianis and Chet Ramis appear to worship Christ, and attempt to combine all three faiths. But they are not very numerous, and the members of the Brahma Samaj and other theistic reforming Churches are in the same case, for they can only be counted by thousands in this country of millions. One can therefore hardly avoid the startling conclusion that in the most educated, progressive, and talkative province of India the vast majority of the population belong to a form of Hinduism which exhibits few progressive elements, but encourages the worst superstitions of the nation. And these superstitions are not rejected by the Swadeshi movement, which seems to have definitely affiliated itself to the worship of Kali. The weakness of the Brahma Samaj and other theistic bodies is peculiarly interesting. Here the approved principles of liberal European theology have been placed by Hindus before the intellectual public of India. No obstacles to their propagation were offered by Government or European opinion, but rather the contrary, and the result has been an insignificant number of converts, who have already split into three sects. A deduction may, I think, be drawn from this, affect-




ing the attitude of the Hindu mind towards social and political questions—namely, that the desire to make radical changes and adopt European usages is really confined to a small class of the population, who are largely influenced by ambition and by a feeling that the present position somehow indicates that Indians are inferior to Europeans.

The failure of the various European churches to make much impression on the vast mass of Hinduism seems to me less remarkable than this failure of theism to win the educated classes. Few Europeans have embraced Hinduism, and those few mainly in India, with the result that they have been thought crazy by their compatriots. For the Hindu, the mental and moral revolution involved in a change of religion is as great or even greater. Yet the change is mainly social: Christianity does not present itself to him as a new light, as an intellectual revelation. It is:

Naught but the wide-world story how a deity once was man.

That, in the opinion of the Hindu, is an eminently natural and proper basis for a creed, but still the incarnation of a deity has happened and happens still so often in India that he can hardly be expected to upset his whole life because Europeans have discovered that it once happened elsewhere. And Europeans do not expect it; for, agreeably to the severely neutral principles of the Indian Government, most Anglo-Indians are far from being proselytisers, and probably leave on Hindus the impression that they have no religion at all. I should be the last to blame the Government for its impartial attitude, but I think that this extreme aloofness in matters of religion is one of the reasons for the curious want of contact between Europeans and Indians. An intensely religious people like the Hindus, however much they may dislike interference and coercion, can understand a zealot, and even a persecutor, better than a philanthropist who urges moral and sanitary measures for motives which do not appeal to them.

At present Hinduism appears to be undergoing a marked revival. Amongst the poorer classes the number of pilgrims and devotees shows no diminution, and numerous brand-new temples bear witness to its power over the purses of the wealthy, and also, alas! to its inability to inspire contemporary art with any elevating ideas. This animation is probably part of the general growth of a national sentiment. A religious people waking to a consciousness of its natural existence naturally looks to its religion as the chief expression of that existence, and the dislike for Europeans expresses itself in an aversion to Christianity. Also British legal ideas have had a curious influence in strengthening and codifying Hindu custom. Formerly the religious law as to marriage, inheritance, and the like was fluid and varying, like everything else in Hinduism, but British Courts require these contracts and dispositions to be made according to Hindu law, and hence have given many ceremonies and observances new strength and value. It will be interesting to see whether Hinduism will be able to retain its position as the chief expression of the national character. Its deficiency is not that it is backward and unable to compete with modern ideas, for it has a wealth of philosophy and





a protean power of reinterpretation and re-expression, but rather that it never has evolved a form of public worship on even approximately the same level as its better doctrines. Such widely differing religions as Buddhism and Mohammedanism have ceremonies comparable to those of the Christian Church, but Hinduism, for the most part, prescribes, or at least approves, a jumble of pagan rites. They are not without the grandeur which comes from great crowds, vast buildings, and a skilful use of mystery, but they are often puerile and sometimes scandalous. An explanation is always forthcoming, but even among the most speculative and emotional people in the world there will always be a large percentage who do not go beyond externals, and, besides, many of the esoteric doctrines held by one or other of the inconsistent sects of Hinduism—such as that the saint cannot sin; that the priest represents, or actually is the God; that the amorous adventures of Krishna typify the progress of the human soul—are capable of dangerous misinterpretation, and are so misinterpreted.

At the present moment the two strongest movements in Hinduism seem to be the Arya Samaj (of which I have spoken in a previous letter) and Theosophy. It is curious that the first, founded by a Hindu and among Hindus, should preach doctrinal simplification and social reform and aim at clearing away the jungle of popular superstition and observances; whereas the latter, originated by Europeans and Americans, and only imported into India, is far more conservative. With a flexibility not alien to Asiatic ideas, it has oscillated between Hinduism and Buddhism; but its object has always been to introduce order and decency rather than to change—to turn the jungle into a park. Any amount of criticism, both learned and popular, is forthcoming against Theosophy. Scholars may maintain that it misunderstands its subject-matter, and the average European is likely to think it demented. But there can be no doubt that it is a force among Hindus. It does not figure in the Census, because its associates give themselves no special name; but it is well financed and well managed; it has many branches in most provinces, with a large membership, and it is admitted even by missionaries, who peculiarly detest it, that it has taken hold of the educated classes of Hindus as few other movements have been able to do.



## XV.—THE MOHAMMEDANS.

*(Concluding Article.)*

In these letters I have treated India as being mainly a Hindu country, and this view, I think, is just, for the Mohammedans are not only a relatively small part of the population, but also, being mostly converted Hindus, they have been strongly influenced in social matters by their Hindu origin and environment. But still they are a separate and important body; they were once the ruling class, and have not forgotten it; they have their own strong and weak points, and in many ways they offer a contrast to other Indians, particularly Babus.

Rather more than a fifth of the inhabitants of India are Mohammedans. The creed flourishes best in the North, and is comparatively weak in the centre and South. In the Nizam's dominions only about 10 per cent. of the people belong to it, though it is the religion of the ruling house, and in the whole Presidency of Madras its adherents are not much more than 6 per cent.

It is natural that Mohammedans should be numerous in the North-West. This is the region which during a long period was constantly invaded from Afghanistan, Persia, and Central Asia, and the present population are to some extent descendants of the invaders. The native city of Lahore, though its walls have been pulled down, has still something about it that recalls Bokhara and Samarkand, and is totally unlike Benares, Poona, or Madura. But it is in Delhi and Agra that Indian Mohammedanism found its most striking expression. Here it is something more than an invading and destructive force, for the beautiful architecture of these cities, where imported and native excellences—severe majesty of outline and a prodigal use of delicate ornament and colouring—are happily combined, indicates that art and thought must have been as busy as the sword. Further east, in Oudh and Bengal, there are plenty of Mohammedans and plenty of Mosques; but the art is imitative and commonplace, and the men have lost the hawk-like, conquering air which comes naturally to those who live among sands and rocks and walled cities with great gateways, but vanishes in rice-fields and stucco pavilions. About two-fifths of the total number of Mohammedans are found in Bengal, which seems strange, for it was never the seat of a great Mohammedan dynasty. The explanation probably is that when Islam first appeared there the



population was imperfectly Hinduised, so that the new civilisation met with little opposition. The Mohammedan sects of Bombay and Western India have a different origin. Some of them, such as the Moplahs of Malabar, seem to be the descendants of Arab immigrants, and others are due to the preaching of missionaries who came from Arabia or Persia.

Indian Mohammedans leave on the observer a general impression that they belong to one race and are different from Hindus. This is partly due to the fact that many of them come from the North-West and do belong, more or less, to the same race. But still, from whatever district they come, they have many qualities in common, and in some respects are superior to Hindus. They are more martial and make better soldiers. Also, their general physique seems better. The census shows that they live longer, have more children, and of late have increased four times as rapidly as the population at large. In most districts they enjoy a more healthy diet, being less hampered by religious restrictions as to food, and their marriage customs are better. It is true that polygamy is more prevalent among them, and that their women are more strictly secluded; but the age of marriage is more reasonable, widows are allowed to remarry, and caste and social regulations form a relatively small difficulty. But in education, and probably in quickness of intelligence, the Mohammedans as a whole are markedly behind the Hindus. Their backwardness is seen both in secondary and still more in higher, education. Its principal cause is said to be that custom insists on boys attending a Koran school. Here they merely learn by heart passages which they do not understand, and remain until an age when, among the poorer classes at least, they are expected to begin earning a living. Hence fewer Mohammedans than Hindus reach the standard required for official positions, although the class possessing the necessary means and social qualifications is probably larger in proportion to the whole community. I have not been able to discover in what proportions the two religions are represented in the ranks of the native army, but it would seem that the Mohammedans of most districts supply recruits, whereas only a few special classes of Hindus are of any value for military purposes.

The census returns the great majority of Indian Mohammedans as Sunnis—that is, members of the ordinary orthodox sect—but it is probable that there are more Shi'ahs than these described as such. This sect, which has its headquarters in Persia and Afghanistan, seems to have a certain consciousness of heresy or peculiarity, for its members consider it lawful to conceal their opinions. It has a general tendency towards what is emotional, artistic, and mystical in religion, and in particular carries the veneration of saints to a point not far removed from idolatry. All this is congenial to the Hindu. One of the principal Shi'ah observances is the celebration of the death of Hasan and Hussein by dramatic performances or a funeral procession in which ornamental coffins are carried. This rite is very popular in Northern India, and even Sunnis of the lower classes take part in it, though theoretically



it should be an abomination to them. We also find that sects which are heretical, even from the Shiah point of view, are numerous, such as the followers of the Aga Khan in Bombay, while in other parts still more heterodox combinations of Hinduism and Islam flourish, such as the Panchpiriyas of Bengal and the Chet Ramis of the Punjab, who combine the worship of Christ with Hinduism and Islam. All this backsliding from the simple creed of Mohammed has not failed to call forth movements of protest, especially the Wahabi revival. This was strong in Bengal in the middle of the nineteenth century, but now seems to have spent its force.

Mohammedanism increases at a greater rate than Hinduism because the birth-rate is higher, and there is also some active proselytism, especially in Madras; but Hinduism, while not nominally adding to its numbers, maintains, and perhaps increases its influence. Mohammedans imitate the Hindu caste system, under other names, though it is alien to the spirit of the Koran, in many districts they employ Brahmans for certain ceremonies, they visit Hindu shrines and take part in Hindu festivals.

Hence many influences tend to assimilate the low-class easy-going Mohammedan to the Hindu, but in the upper classes family tradition and better religious teaching make the distinction clearer. Though in periods of peace and sloth Hindus and Moslims grow very like one another, and though in crises (e.g., the Mutiny) they can act together, yet they are continually pulled apart by jealousies and discordant interests. They are often of different blood, and when the blood is the same they are generally of different status or trades. The idea that a good Moslim has a natural right to take tribute of the agriculturist and shop-keeper is not dead in the breast of many a man-at-arms, and the same Mohammedan who attends a Hindu festival for the fun of the thing, is ready for precisely the same reason to join a riot and suppress the festival. And, though one set of considerations makes educated men feel the unity of the Indian people, another set unites educated Mohammedans in the disagreeable conviction that the Hindus are getting the better of them under present conditions. The British annexation deprived them of their empire, and the Pax Britannica offered a great opportunity to the unwarlike but intelligent races to advance at their expense. Until recently pride and that distaste for intellectual subtleties and novelties which so often accompanies Islam made them stand contemptuously aloof. But when they came to understand that their isolation and rigidity placed them at a disadvantage compared with Bengalis, Mahrattas, and Parsis, they prepared to make good their deficiencies, and everything was in their favour. The Government had every sympathy with educational movements, and, though old-fashioned persons might demur to any change, the position of Mohammedans in the Indian world was admittedly unsatisfactory, and an attempt to redress it could not fail to command approval.

This educational movement was inaugurated by a remarkable man—the late Syed Ahmad—and culminated in the foundation of the College of Aligarh, one of the most interesting, as it is





becoming one of the best known, institutions in India. Even more than the Colleges of Benares and the various Chiefs' Colleges, it is an instance of the mingling of Eastern and Western ideas. The governing body are Indian Mohammedans; the Principal, and many of the teaching staff, Europeans. Its resemblance to an English university—its quadrangles, rooms, libraries, and playing-grounds—its European teaching and athletics, have often been described. Two things in it struck me especially. One was that the two sides of the Mosque are assigned to Sunnis and Shiah's respectively, and that the two sects use the same building for their prayers. Such an arrangement would, I think, be impossible in most Mohammedan countries, and its existence here argues a strong sense of the unity of Islam and a desire to forget minor differences. The other point was that many of the boys are married. When one sees Indian youths cramming English text-books for their examinations and talking the slang of English games, one is apt to think the metamorphosis more complete than it really is. Even in the vacation they fall under the influence of oriental family life, and after they have concluded their course at the college it would seem that they see little of one another or their old teachers.

But, still, the effects of the movement are great, and, what is rare in Indian movements, it gives satisfaction to the British authorities. Since any concerted action by Mohammedans is certain to encounter the opposition of the Hindu majority, and since an appeal to arms, in which alone they could hope for pre-eminence, is impossible, it is clear that their only hope lies in loyalty to the Government, for if both the Government and the Hindu majority were against them their position would be hopeless. They have taken little part in the recent troubles except in Eastern Bengal, where they were the attacked rather than the attacking party. As a community they have not supported the Indian Congress, and it would appear that they have definitely refused the overtures of Pan-Islamic emissaries who have sought to spread the doctrine that all Mohammedans owe allegiance to the Sultan of Turkey. We are assured that Indian Doctors have pronounced that under British rule India is not *Daru'l-harb*, hostile or infidel territory, where rebellion is lawful, but *Daru'l-Islam*—that is, territory where the precepts of Islam are respected, and whose rulers are entitled to respect in return. Only the other day it was announced that the Maulvis of the Punjab were assisting the sanitary authorities, and had declared that it was the duty of good Mohammedans to quit infected localities.

Syed Ahmad advised his co-religionists to abstain from interference in politics, but last year it became felt that the community was letting itself slide into an unduly disadvantageous position. So on October 1 a deputation waited on the Viceroy and presented an address. The incident is interesting as offering a contrast to Hindu methods. Everything savouring of popular agitation was carefully avoided, and the proceedings were most decorous; permission to approach the Viceroy was obtained, delegates were elected so as to ensure a body representative of all India, and a memorial was drawn up in dignified and tem-



perate language. The main principle enunciated was that since in India political parties are determined by race and religion, representation on such bodies as the Legislative councils ought to be by communities, and "not be left to the hazard of election by a numerical majority." In other words, if the population of a province is three-quarters Hindu and one quarter Mohammedan, elections conducted on ordinary English methods are likely to cause the return of Hindu representatives only; but this result is not just, as it might be in a struggle between Liberals and Conservatives, because the distinction between Hindus and Mohammedans is greater than any in British political life. They therefore requested that a certain number of elective posts should be reserved for representatives of Mohammedans. It was justly observed at the time that this proposal shows a better political sense than the clamours of Hindu agitators; it is not merely imitative, and it demands nothing on the assumption that what is good for Europeans must be good for Indians; it states correctly the grievance of the Mohammedans, and suggests a constitutional remedy. But at the same time one fact should be remembered, which is often forgotten by Anglo-Indians in their sympathy with Mohammedans—namely, that the real cause why the latter are not adequately represented is not so much that their community is a minority as that its members, though sufficiently prominent in wealth and position to make it seem numerically larger than it is, are inferior to Hindus in education and intelligence, and that largely through their own fault.

The Viceroy returned a gracious answer, which bore further fruit in the proposals for the reform of legislative councils published last August and referred to the Provincial Governments for discussion. It is there suggested that in addition to the Mohammedans who may be able to secure election by ordinary methods, a certain number of seats should be assigned to Mohammedans only on each of the Councils and that a special Mohammedan electorate be constituted for the purpose of filling them, or rather some of them, for others are to be filled by nomination, because "Indian gentlemen of position sometimes refuse to offer themselves as candidates . . . by reason of their reluctance to risk the indignity of being defeated by a rival candidate of inferior social status." It is clear that the Indian Government are disposed to give every encouragement to Mohammedans, especially to the aristocracy, nor can this encouragement be blamed, for they are an element of stability and equilibrium. They have now a great opportunity, for this favourable disposition of the Government coincides with the educational movement at Aligarh. In many Mohammedan countries, such as Turkey and Morocco, everything conspires to make Islam rely on force and reject European education. But in India we have a quite different and very interesting situation, for this rigid and unprogressive creed finds that it has not the influence among Indians which it would wish, because it has neglected education.









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